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ESSAY
DISCHARGED AND DISCARDED: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF A LESS-THAN-HONORABLE
MILITARY DISCHARGE
Hugh McClean*
Between 2011 and 2015, 57,141 soldiers, sailors, and airmen were
separated from service with less-than-honorable (LTH) discharges for minor misconduct related to mental health problems. These discharges disproportionately affected servicemembers of color. These veterans and
others like them face daunting reintegration challenges when they return
to civilian society, as federal agencies and state governments deny them
the beneﬁts that usually facilitate a veteran’s smooth transition to civilian
society. This Essay adds to the scholarly discourse on military discharges
by comparing these veterans’ plight to that of persons arrested or
convicted of criminal offenses, who also suffer from collateral
consequences related to their criminal records long after their involvement
with the criminal legal system. Military review boards, the Department
of Defense (DOD) agencies charged with reviewing and correcting
veterans’ discharges after service, were never intended to address the
collateral consequences of military discharges, and the laws governing
discharge review do not provide the boards with the authority to do so;
however, DOD may ﬁnally be poised to institute reforms. This Essay
responds to DOD’s recent call for the military service branches to consider
the collateral consequences of military discharges in reviewing veterans’
petitions for discharge upgrades. This Essay examines why current laws
and regulations are inadequate to implement DOD’s call and asserts that
reform efforts aimed at addressing the collateral consequences of arrests
and convictions in the criminal legal system must be replicated in the
military. This Essay concludes that, without reform, a permanent class
of dishonored veterans will never successfully reintegrate into society.
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INTRODUCTION
Mr. Gonzalez served in the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2014 as a motor
transport operator, or truck driver.1 During his ﬁrst deployment to Iraq,
1. See Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez to the Convening Gen. of the U.S. Army
Recruiting Command 1 (Mar. 5, 2013) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The author
supervised students representing Mr. Gonzalez (an actual client whose name has been
changed to protect confidentiality) while serving as the Director of the Bob Parsons
Veterans Advocacy Clinic at the University of Baltimore School of Law. Prior to founding
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Mr. Gonzalez led multiple convoys that were struck by improvised explosive devices (IED), mortars, and small arms ﬁre.2 After witnessing the
deaths and injuries of fellow soldiers in these attacks, he returned from
Iraq and began experiencing symptoms of depression, anxiety, and sleep
disturbances, and he sought counseling from the Army.3 He was diagnosed
with major depressive disorder and referred to a psychotherapy program.4
His symptoms worsened, and he was subsequently diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) and was
prescribed antidepressants.5 Despite knowing that Mr. Gonzalez suffered
from depression and alcohol dependence related to his PTSD and TBI,
the Army deployed Mr. Gonzalez twice more during his career, exposing
him to additional IED blasts and trauma.6
The incident that led to Mr. Gonzalez’s discharge occurred three
years after his last deployment. He was arrested on post for driving while
intoxicated with his son in the vehicle and was charged under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).7 Mr. Gonzalez accepted an “Article 15,”
an administrative forum for addressing violations of the UCMJ, and was
found guilty by his unit commander.8 The Army subsequently discharged
him for the misconduct and issued an other-than-honorable (OTH) discharge, despite his severe history of PTSD and TBI and his successful completion of three deployments.9 The criminalization of Mr. Gonzalez’s
mental health condition effectively terminated his chances of receiving
medical treatment in service for his PTSD or TBI and reduced his chances

the clinic, the author served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s
Corps for more than ten years, where he litigated military discharge cases both for and
against the Air Force.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Memorandum from an Attending Psychiatrist, Trauma Recovery Program, Walter
Reed Nat’l Mil. Med. Ctr., to the Record 1 (Feb. 24, 2014) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
5. See Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 1. Mr. Gonzalez began experiencing increased nightmares, startle response, and irritability. Memorandum from an
Attending Psychiatrist, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 1.
7. See id. The UCMJ is a federal law that codiﬁes military criminal offenses. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801–946 (2018). Mr. Gonzalez was charged with various UCMJ offenses, including (1)
driving while under the inﬂuence of alcohol; (2) driving while under the inﬂuence of alcohol while transporting a minor; (3) failure to transport a child under age sixteen in a seat
belt; and (4) operating a motor vehicle with the operator not restrained by a seat belt. See
id. § 913.
8. 10 U.S.C. § 815. Article 15 of the UCMJ authorizes commanders to hear evidence,
make ﬁndings of guilt, and punish servicemembers without a trial by court-martial. Servicemembers have the right to decline Article 15 adjudication and demand trial by courtmartial.
9. Certiﬁcate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, U.S. Dep’t of the Army (Aug.
2009) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).

2206

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:2203

of obtaining Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) healthcare after service.10 More importantly, it discounted his medical condition and characterized his service such that it would create lasting barriers to employment,
education, housing, healthcare, and other critical aspects of civilian life.
Unfortunately, Mr. Gonzalez’s case is not unique. In 2017, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that 62% of servicemembers discharged from service for misconduct between 2011 and 2015
had been diagnosed with PTSD, TBI, or some other mental health disorder within the two years preceding their discharges.11 Of those who were
discharged, 23% received an OTH discharge and 70% received a “general”
discharge.12 The GAO concluded that servicemembers with mental health
issues were being disproportionately discharged with OTH or general discharges, collectively referred to as “less-than-honorable (LTH) discharges,” without due consideration of their mental health statuses.13
Statistically, Mr. Gonzalez’s skin color also likely played a role in his
discharge. In June 2020, the House Armed Services Committee Military
Personnel Subcommittee held a hearing where a GAO official testiﬁed that
servicemembers of color were twice as likely to face courts-martial as white
servicemembers and were more likely to face nonjudicial punishment.14 In
response to these statistics, top officials in the Air Force and Army testiﬁed
that determining the causes of the racial disparities would require further
10. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. to Mr. Gonzalez (Mar. 7, 2015) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6) (2020) (“However, if a person was
discharged or released by reason of the sentence of a general court-martial, only a finding of
insanity . . . or a decision of a board of correction of records established under 10 U.S.C. 1552
can establish basic eligibility to receive Department of Veterans Affairs benefits.”).
11. Randall B. Williamson, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-260, DOD Health:
Actions Needed to Ensure Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury Are
Considered in Misconduct Separations 12 (2017) [hereinafter GAO Discharge Report]. According to the report, the military separated the servicemembers for minor misconduct including drug use, absenteeism, and insubordination. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 14. A general discharge signiﬁes separation with a lesser degree of honor
than an honorable discharge. The discharge is given when “faithful service is marred by
negative aspects of a person’s duty performance or personal conduct, but the negative aspects deﬁnitely outweigh the good.” U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Instr. 36-3208,
Administrative Separation of Airmen, para. A3.3. (2019) [hereinafter AFI 36-3208].
13. See GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11, at 31.
14. Racial Disparity in the Military Justice System—How to Fix the Culture: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Pers. of the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. (2020),
(statement of Brenda Farrell, Dir., Def. Capabilities and Mgmt. Team, U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Off.); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-20-648T, Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Mil. Pers., Comm. on Armed Servs., H.R., Military Justice: DOD and the Coast
Guard Need to Improve Their Capabilities to Assess Racial Disparities 19 (2020) [hereinafter GAO Racial Disparity Report] (statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Dir., Def. Capabilities and
Mgmt.); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 11692, § 540I, 133 Stat. 1198, 1369–71 (2019) (directing the Secretary of Defense to report the
race, ethnicity, and gender of the victim and the accused in courts-martial, to establish criteria to determine when data indicating racial disparity should be further reviewed, and to
take action to remedy racial inequality in the military legal system).
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exploration.15 The tone-deaf responses from senior Department of
Defense (DOD) officials echoed a DOD study that had reached the same
conclusion some ﬁfty years earlier.16
The cycle of injustice, then, is that servicemembers are promised beneﬁts and, once enlisted, exposed to serious health hazards such as PTSD,
TBI, and other mental health disorders.17 When they exhibit symptoms
15. See Barry K. Robinson & Edgar Chen, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Racial Disparity in
the Military Justice System, Just Sec. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72424/
deja-vu-all-over-again-racial-disparity-in-the-military-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/EV4
6-BMZ4] (“Despite these jarring statistics, the GAO testiﬁed that it was not in a position to
determine whether these ﬁgures were the result of unlawful discrimination.”).
16. See id. (noting that, in 1972, a task force commissioned by President Richard
Nixon found that inadequate educational advancement opportunities and lack of diversity
in the leadership corps drove racial disparities in the military justice system). Recent events,
too, underscore the problem of institutionalized racism in the military. On January 6, 2021,
a mob of President Donald Trump’s supporters invaded the U.S. Capitol, resulting in the
death of ﬁve Americans. Among the mob of violent and armed protesters were military veterans with training and expertise, some in full tactical gear, who played an instrumental role
in the attack on elected officials, including the Vice President, while Congress was engaged
in carrying out its constitutional duties. See, e.g., Air Force Vet Photographed in Capitol
Riot Arrest in Texas, Mil. Times (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/
news/your-military/2021/01/11/air-force-vet-photographed-in-capitol-riot-arrested-in-texas/
[https://perma.cc/L8YL-Z7Y9] (reporting that retired Air Force Lt. Col. Larry Randall
Brock, Jr. was charged in the District of Columbia on one count of entering or remaining in
a restricted building without lawful authority and one count of violent entry on Capitol
grounds); Michael Biesecker, Jake Bleiberg & James Laporta, Capitol Rioters Included
Highly Trained Ex-Military and Cops, AP News (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article
/ex-military-cops-us-capitol-riot-a1cb17201dfddc98291edead5badc257 [https://perma.cc/
LQ4D-5CGN]; Rob Kuznia & Ashley Fantz, They Swore to Protect America. Some Also
Joined the Riot, CNN (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/12/us/militaryextremism-capitol-riot-invs/index.html [https://perma.cc/PY6L-2J5Q]. A 2019 Military
Times survey of its readers found that more than one-third of active-duty troops and half of
servicemembers of color had personally witnessed examples of white nationalism or racism
in recent months. See Leo Shane III, Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in
Poll of Active-Duty Troops, Mil. Times (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/
news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-pollof-active-duty-troops/ [https://perma.cc/MSC2-M5NX] (describing examples of white nationalist or ideologically driven racism such as swastikas drawn on servicemembers’ cars,
stickers supporting the Ku Klux Klan, and Nazi-style salutes between individuals); see also
Kim Hjelmgaard, Secret Audio Recordings Detail How White Supremacists Seek Recruits
From Military, Police, USA Today (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2020/10/15/splc-releases-audio-how-neo-nazi-group-recruits-military-police/3661460001/
[https://perma.cc/9F2R-NCC4]; Military, Veterans, and Society Program, Virtual
Roundtable: A Conversation on Race in the Military, Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. (Sept. 23,
2020), https://www.cnas.org/events/virtual-roundtable-a-conversation-on-race-in-the-military
[https://perma.cc/TF64-Y4NP].
17. See generally Lisa K. Richardson, B. Christopher Frueh & Ronald Acierno,
Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Review,
44 Austl. & N.Z. J. Psychiatry 4, 5, 15 (2010) (reporting that the prevalence of combat-related
PTSD in U.S. military veterans since the Vietnam War ranges from about 2% to 17%). The
prevalence of PTSD among servicemembers and veterans is difficult to determine due to
underreporting and differences in diagnosing, sampling, and measurement strategies. See
id. at 12 (attributing the considerable variability in the results of the study to differences in
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related to these illnesses in the form of misconduct, they are drawn into
the military legal system. Statistics show that this is twice as likely to happen
to servicemembers of color than to white servicemembers.18 Involvement
in the military legal system is then used as a basis for discharge and recorded as an LTH discharge in official records, creating a lifelong stigma of
dishonorable service for the veterans.19
Much has been written about the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions that prevent individuals with criminal histories from becoming
productive members of society.20 Less well understood, however, are the
sampling strategies and measurement strategies). Generally, the rate of PTSD among veterans varies by military conﬂict. Id. at 2 (listing ﬁndings of PTSD prevalence rates among veterans of the Vietnam War, Gulf War, and conﬂict in the Middle East). According to one
major study of Vietnam veterans, 15.2% of male veterans and 8.5% of female veterans suffered from PTSD at the time of the 1988 study. Richard A. Kulka, William E. Schlenger, John
A. Fairbank, Richard L. Hough, B. Kathleen Jordan, Charles R. Marmar & Daniel S. Weiss,
Trauma and the Vietnam War Generation: Report of Findings From the National Vietnam
Veterans Readjustment Study 52 (Routledge 2013) (1990). Researchers estimated 30.9% of
males and 26.9% of females had suffered from PTSD at some time in their lives. Id. at 53.
According to the VA, in any given year, about 11% to 20% of veterans from Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Desert Storm (the Gulf War) receive a PTSD diagnosis. How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, PTSD: Nat’l Ctr. for PTSD,
U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_
veterans.asp [https://perma.cc/UN9T-K989] (last visited July 27, 2021). Moreover, PTSD is
more prevalent in the military population than in the general population. See Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, Nat’l All. on Mental Illness, https://www.nami.org/About-Mental-Illness/
Mental-Health-Conditions/Posttraumatic-Stress-Disorder/ [https://perma.cc/2BAF-BFSJ] (last
visited July 27, 2021) (noting that PTSD affects about 3.6% of the U.S. adult population).
18. GAO Racial Disparity Report, supra note 14, at 15.
19. See Dana Montalto, Bradford Adams, Barton Stichman & Drew Ensign, Veterans
Legal Clinic, Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harvard L. Sch., Underserved: How the VA Wrongfully
Excludes Veterans With Bad Paper 2–3 (2016), https://uploads-ssl.webﬂow.com/5ddda3d7
ad8b1151b5d16cff/5e67da6782e5f4e6b19760b0_Underserved.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R
UB-TG49] [hereinafter Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved] (“In 2013, VA Regional Offices
labeled 90% of veterans with bad paper discharges as ‘Dishonorable’—even though the military chose not to Dishonorably discharge them.”). PTSD receives much media attention,
though veterans suffer from other war-related mental health disorders as well. PTSD symptoms often coexist with depression, anxiety, and substance use. Symptoms usually begin
within three months after experiencing a traumatic event, but symptoms may occasionally
emerge years later. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, supra note 17. Because of the potential
latency of PTSD symptoms, a servicemember could be diagnosed with depression and anxiety during service but not develop or manifest the full symptoms of PTSD until after discharge. A related but separate problem involves the discharge of servicemembers for
“personality disorders,” which do not qualify for VA disability compensation. Between 2001
and 2015, more than 31,000 servicemembers were separated with a personality disorder designation. See Joshua Kors, Investigative Reporter Alissa Figueroa Exposes Stunning Flaws in
Veterans’ Beneﬁts System, HuffPost (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
investigative-reporter-al_b_6382880 [https://perma.cc/4QS2-93TU] (last updated Dec. 6,
2017).
20. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 226 (2015) (“Employment
discrimination has always made it especially difficult for an ex-convict to avoid resorting to
crime as a necessary means of survival.”); Margaret Colgate Love, Jenny Roberts & Wayne
A. Logan, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Law, Policy and Practice
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collateral consequences of LTH discharges that create barriers to obtaining healthcare, disability compensation, education, housing, employment,
and other transitional necessities for veterans.21 This Essay adds to the discourse on military discharges by examining the collateral consequences of
discharge characterizations through a criminal law lens.22 This Essay argues that while discharges are technically administrative actions, they have
been doing the work of criminal convictions in the military for some time.
Since World War II, the lines between administrative action and criminal
punishment have become increasingly blurred.23 Today, veterans who are
disciplined through either process continue to be punished long after service through the collateral consequences of their military service.24 In this
way, they share a hardship experienced by people involved in the criminal
§§ 1.11–1.12 (2018–2019 ed.) [hereinafter Love et al., Collateral Consequences]
(describing the legal and reputational collateral consequences of criminal convictions);
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Incarceration, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1818 (2012) [hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death]
(arguing that civil death, an obsolete form of civil punishment, has reemerged in the form
of a change in legal status of persons involved in the criminal legal system); Michael
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Collateral Consequences]
(stating that individuals with criminal histories are confronted with a range of collateral
consequences including ineligibility for public housing, welfare beneﬁts, student loans, and
employment opportunities).
21. See John W. Brooker, Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond “T.B.D.”:
Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s Beneﬁt Eligibility Following
Involuntary or Punitive Discharge From the Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2012)
(“The military, through its discharge process, is creating huge handicaps to readjustment
and reintegration into society by limiting the possibility of care and failing to at the least
stabilize these warriors before their rough ejection.”); Liam Brennan, How Veterans Affairs
Denies Care to Many of the People It’s Supposed to Serve, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-veterans-affairs-denies-care-to-many-of-thepeople-its-supposed-to-serve/2019/11/08/2c105b48-0183-11ea-9518-1e76abc088b6_story.html
[https://perma.cc/sn7f-755d] (“These former service members [discharged as other than
honorable] are often excluded from VA health care, from VA housing if they are homeless,
from VA beneﬁts payments even if they’re disabled by their service and from the educational
supports provided to other veterans.”).
22. Recent scholarship on discharge review has focused on the service departments’
failure to apply favorable standards of review for veterans with PTSD and TBI who are seeking discharge upgrades. See, e.g., Jessica Lynn Wherry, Kicked Out, Kicked Again: The
Discharge Review Boards’ Illiberal Application of Liberal Consideration for Veterans With
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1357, 1387 (2019). Scholars have also criticized VA’s exclusionary eligibility criteria for receipt of veterans’ beneﬁts. See, e.g.,
Bradford Adams & Dana Montalto, With Malice Toward None: Revisiting the Historical and
Legal Basis for Excluding Veterans From “Veteran” Services, 122 Penn St. L. Rev. 69, 134
(2017).
23. See Stephanie Smith Ledesma, PTSD and Bad Paper Discharges: Why the Fairness
to Soldiers Act Is Too Little, Too Late, 10 Elon L. Rev. 189, 227 (2018) (noting that commanders commonly circumvent constitutional protections of servicemembers by using administrative discharges to remove troops from service).
24. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40 (describing the story of a veteran who was
denied access to medical care more than ﬁve years after receiving an other-than-honorable
discharge).
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legal system. The movement to limit the collateral consequences of criminal arrests and convictions has much to offer military justice.
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of the current law, regulations,
and policy governing the military discharge system. It also discusses the
military’s increasing use of administrative discharges in lieu of courts-martial to address minor misconduct. Part II examines the collateral consequences of criminal convictions, their disproportionate effects on communities of color, and their invisible role in the criminal legal system.25 It
examines recent advances at the state and local level to ease the undue
weight and burden that criminal convictions place on individuals. It then
draws lessons from these advances to argue that the collateral consequences of military discharges, which are strikingly similar to those of criminal convictions, must be addressed, and their disproportionate effect on
disabled veterans eliminated. Part III explores solutions to the military’s
collateral consequences problem, analyzing efforts by DOD to adopt a
clemency approach to discharge review, and examines other proposals to
adopt a more redemptive approach to collateral consequences. This Essay
concludes that a multifaceted approach is necessary, and it must include
the codiﬁcation of DOD’s clemency guidance, broader access to VA beneﬁts for veterans with LTH discharges, and statewide efforts to reduce the
effects of discharge characterizations on employment.
I. DISCHARGE CHARACTERIZATIONS
The military has long been an attractive option for young adults looking to escape the conﬁnes of poverty, racial inequality, family strife, or the
dearth of employment opportunities in their local communities.26 For
these individuals, the opportunity for economic security is hard to pass up.
In exchange for their service, the military promises them competitive salaries and a generous beneﬁts package, including disability compensation
for injuries sustained in service.27 Most servicemembers, however, are not

25. See Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences, in 4 Reforming Criminal Justice:
Punishment, Incarceration, and Release 371, 372 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (explaining that the
negative consequences for people convicted of a crime are perpetuated by being labeled as
a criminal and subjected to collateral consequences even after release from incarceration).
26. John Bowden, Ocasio-Cortez Calls for End to Federal Funding for Military
Recruitment in Schools, Hill (July 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/budget
-appropriations/509218-ocasio-cortez-calls-for-end-to-federal-funding-for/ [https://perma.cc/
5ZKN-MY9W] (arguing that the Army and Navy target high school students in low-income
communities for enlistment, often using popular video games, such as Call of Duty: Warzone,
in their recruitment messaging).
27. See Brian Martucci, Joining the Military After High School—Beneﬁts & Risks,
Money Crashers (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.moneycrashers.com/joining-military-beneﬁtsrisks/ [https://perma.cc/46HR-SWM4] (describing the rewards of military service, including ﬁnding purpose, serving the country, tuition assistance, training, travel, competitive salary, enlistment bonuses, and post-service beneﬁts, but acknowledging the risks of death or
physical and mental injury).
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informed that these beneﬁts are conditioned on the award of an honorable discharge characterization.28 They do not understand that the process
of awarding service characterizations, a status that military commanders
confer upon servicemembers at the time of discharge, is wrought with inequities, and that beneﬁts promised at enlistment are denied to those with
LTH discharges.29 This section provides an overview of the discharge process, with a focus on the military’s increasing reliance on LTH administrative discharges as a means to hastily separate servicemembers for minor
misconduct, thereby denying them the beneﬁts promised at the time of
their enlistment.
A. Military Discharges
Most servicemembers are authorized to leave the military after completing their service obligation.30 Those who are discharged or released
from military duty prior to the expiration of their terms of service require
special authorization.31 DOD provides general discharge guidance to the
military departments through regulations and policy memoranda but delegates the authority to discharge servicemembers to the service secretaries.32 Discharges are divided into two broad categories: voluntary and
involuntary.33 Voluntary discharges may be authorized for hardship, pregnancy, schooling, and a variety of other reasons.34 Involuntary discharges
occur when the military releases a servicemember from duty against their
will because of misconduct or because the member lacks the potential for
further service.35 This Essay focuses on involuntary discharges because they
are more likely to result in OTH discharge characterizations.

28. Umar Moulta-Ali & Sidath Viranga Panangala, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43928, Veterans’
Beneﬁts: The Impact of Military Discharges on Basic Eligibility 15–16 (2015) (depicting a
ﬂowchart used to determine the limited circumstances under which a veteran with an OTH
discharge might be eligible for beneﬁts).
29. Wherry, supra note 22, at 1368.
30. See DOPMA/ROPMA Policy Reference Tool: Military Service Obligation and
Active Duty Service Obligation, Rand Corp., http://dopma-ropma.rand.org/military-serviceobligation.html [https://perma.cc/R3EK-B9FR] (last visited July 27, 2021) (listing the different service obligations and their accompanying federal statutes for each branch of the
military).
31. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at para. 1.1 (“No member may be discharged
or released before expiration of term of service (ETS) except as prescribed by the Secretary
of the Air Force, by sentence of court-martial, or as otherwise prescribed by law.”).
32. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, enclosure 5 (Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter DODDI 1332.14] (describing how each military department has its own discharge regulations that comply with DOD instructions).
33. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at tbls.1.2 & 1.3.
34. Id.
35. U.S. Air Force, The Judge Advocate General’s School, The Military Commander
and the Law 75 (17th ed. 2021), https://www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/documents/
Publications/MCL%202021.pdf?ver=ong1RuaOkGtvCugyNeniLA%3d%3d [https://perma
.cc/ZC8P-DQW4] [hereinafter The Military Commander and the Law].

2212

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:2203

1. Punitive Discharges. — Of the two types of involuntary discharges,36
punitive discharges, the more severe form of punishment, may only be authorized through courts-martial and may be characterized as either a bad
conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge.37 Punitive discharge characterizations are intended to be stigmatizing and to reﬂect the criminal behavior and poor duty performance of the servicemember.38 Because of its
stigma, a punitive discharge is considered by servicemembers to be the
most serious sanction that the military can impose.39
2. Administrative Discharges. — In contrast, an administrative discharge is a personnel action. It is executed through a streamlined administrative process that affords considerably less due process to
servicemembers than courts-martial.40 Because of their expediency, administrative discharges are by far the more common form of involuntary discharge.41 A servicemember can receive an administrative discharge under
honorable, general (under honorable conditions), or OTH conditions.42
36. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 2(c). For a historical perspective on discharge characterizations, see Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 74. The
practice of characterizing servicemembers’ discharges was borrowed from the British. In the
late eighteenth century, during the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress adopted
the British practice of separating soldiers with honorable or dishonorable characterizations.
See Bradley K. Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical
Evaluation, 59 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1973). Much like today, the dishonorable discharge was
rarely used, reserved only for servicemembers who committed grave offenses, and could
only be imposed by order of a general court-martial. In the late nineteenth century, the
military adopted administrative discharges as a means for commanders to discharge servicemembers for various reasons without holding a court-martial. These reasons included unsuitability for service, unﬁtness, misconduct, for the good of the service, and general
conduct falling between honorable and dishonorable. See Harry V. Lerner, Effect of
Character of Discharge and Length of Service on Eligibility to Veterans’ Beneﬁts, 13 Mil. L.
Rev. 121, 132 (1961). Character of discharges have always played an important role in the
determination of military pensions and other beneﬁts.
37. Manual For Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1003(b)(8) (2019). A court-martial is the equivalent of a civilian criminal court. A dishonorable discharge may only be imposed by order of a general court-martial, the highest level of trial court in the military. Id.
at 1003(b)(8)(B); see also Richard J. Bednar, Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the
Armed Forces, 16 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1962).
38. Christopher H. Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83
Yale L.J. 33, 35 (1973) (noting that though dishonorable discharges and bad conduct discharges are expressly punitive, a general discharge characterization constitutes “a stigma of
tremendous impact which [has] a lifelong effect” and creates a “deﬁnite disadvantage” to
veterans seeking civilian employment).
39. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 74 (“[T]his classiﬁcation has always been
reserved for the most severe misconduct and remains relatively rare.”).
40. See Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 135, 159 (2016) (“Unfortunately, there is no clear, uniform deﬁnition of what misconduct will result in an OTH discharge, and each military branch has separate guidance.”).
41. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 50 (noting that OTH
discharges account for 5.8% of all characterized discharges while punitive discharges account for about 1% of discharges).
42. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3(a)(1)(a).
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DOD provides broad deﬁnitions for these terms, though each military
branch deﬁnes these terms slightly differently.43 Navy regulations state that
honorable service “generally [meets] the standard of acceptable conduct
and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that
any other characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate.”44
DOD defines OTH service as “[c]onduct involving one or more acts or omissions that constitute a significant departure from the conduct expected of
members of Naval Service.”45 The definitions of these terms among the services are generally the same despite their subtle differences.46
3. Distinctions Between Punitive and Administrative Discharges. — The
distinctions between administrative and punitive discharges can be confusing, even for servicemembers. Discharge characterizations are recorded
on an official discharge document known as the “DD-214,” memorializing
both the character of discharge (e.g., “other-than-honorable”) and the
narrative reason for discharge (e.g., “misconduct”).47 Both punitive and
administrative discharges use service characterizations to denote misconduct or problematic service, making the labels a source of confusion. Servicemembers are generally familiar with the term “dishonorable
discharge” and its connotations but are less familiar with the tiers of administrative discharge characterizations.48 A thorough understanding of
the collateral effects of both is immensely important, especially when a
servicemember accused of misconduct is offered a discharge in lieu of a
court-martial during pretrial plea bargaining.49

43. Id. at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a). The Secretary of Defense has authorized each
service branch to promulgate its own standards for discharges. Each branch has a slightly
different deﬁnition for the types of service characterizations, but all the branches generally
follow the DOD deﬁnition. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & U.S. Coast Guard,
COMDTINST M1000.4, Military Separations (Aug. 21, 2018); U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg.
635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations, paras. 3–4 (Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter AR 635-200]; U.S. Marine Corps, MCO P1900.16F, Separation and Retirement
Manual, para. 1004 (2013); U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual
(Milsperson) 1910-100 (2002).
44. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Military Personnel Manual (Milsperson) 1910-304, para. 1
(June 30, 2008).
45. Id.
46. Wherry, supra note 22, at 1368.
47. See e.g., Certiﬁcate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty, U.S. Dep’t of the
Army, https://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/docs/default-source/veteran-related/dd214-sample.
pdf?sfvrsn=2/ [https://perma.cc/X25P-XHCV] (last visited July 27, 2021) (showing an example of a DD-214).
48. See Daniel Scapardine, Note, Leaving “Other Than Honorable” Soldiers Behind:
How the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Inadvertently Created a Health and
Social Crisis, 76 Md. L. Rev. 1133, 1137 (2017) (describing how OTH veterans require competent and effective representation in order to successfully navigate the discharge petition
process).
49. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 3, para. 11(a) (noting that a servicemember may request to be discharged in lieu of standing trial in order to avoid the
possibility of a conviction and its collateral consequences).
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The authority to discipline and separate servicemembers rests with
military “commanders.”50 Commanders have tremendous discretion to
criminally charge or administratively separate servicemembers for misconduct.51 As Mr. Gonzalez’s case demonstrates, the discretion is sometimes
abused. How could a soldier with an obvious case of mental illness be
discharged for misconduct and given an OTH service characterization
rather than a medical discharge? Even though Mr. Gonzalez’s misconduct
can be attributed to mental illness, commanders may choose from these
basic options when acting in such cases: (1) court-martial, (2) nonjudicial
punishment,52 (3) administrative action, (4) medical discharge,53 or a
combination of these options.54
Mr. Gonzalez’s commander chose nonjudicial Article 15 punishment
and an OTH discharge to resolve Mr. Gonzalez’s situation. Although a
medical discharge may have been more appropriate, the discharge system
favors misconduct separations over medical separations.55 A number of extraordinary events must occur for a servicemember to be discharged for
medical reasons rather than for misconduct.56 The process begins when
the servicemember’s unit commander initiates discharge proceedings
based on the servicemember’s misconduct.57 Servicemembers discharged
50. See Michael Moran, Modern Military Force Structures, Council on Foreign Rels.
(Oct. 26, 2006), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modern-military-force-structures [https
://perma.cc/SWG8-SL94] (explicating the current command structure of the military including ground forces which are organized by squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, division, and corps, each led by commanding officers); see also Stuart
Johnson, John E. Peters, Karin E. Kitchens, Aaron L. Martin & Jordan R. Fischbach, RAND
Nat’l Defense Rsch. Inst., A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure 2 (2012), https:/
/www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR927-2.html [https://perma.cc/PXR2-WMYC]
(reporting on the Army’s transition to a “modular” force structure to address the challenges
of waging war and conducting extended stabilization operations); The Military Commander
and the Law, supra note 35, at 3 (describing the military command structure).
51. Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command Inﬂuence, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1401,
1403–04 (2016) (comparing prosecutorial misconduct in the military and civilian systems).
52. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2018). Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ is
often a precursor to administrative separation.
53. See, e.g., AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(a). Since the late 1980s, the military has signiﬁcantly increased its mental health screening and treatment for servicemembers with mental health disorders. Today, all servicemembers returning from deployment
are required to be screened for mental health problems and are required to complete annual suicide awareness training.
54. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at para. 6.43 (explaining that a commander
may process a recommendation for discharge as a single action when the recommendation
is made for more than one reason).
55. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33; see also U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 63540, Disability Evaluation for Retention, Retirement, or Separation, para. 4-3 (Jan. 19, 2017),
[hereinafter AR 635-40] (noting that criminal or administrative processing for misconduct
takes precedence over medical separations).
56. See AR 635-40, supra note 55, at para. 4-3 (outlining the process for obtaining
medical discharge compared to discharge for misconduct).
57. See id.
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for misconduct are required to obtain both a physical exam and a mental
status evaluation.58 Medical separations take precedence over other administrative separations except for misconduct separations, which are processed concurrently with medical separations.59 If a medical treatment
facility commander or attending medical officer determines that a soldier
does not meet the medical ﬁtness standards for retention, the servicemember is referred to a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) for an official medical ﬁtness determination.60 Even if the MEB ﬁnds that the servicemember
is not medically qualiﬁed for service, the servicemember may still be discharged for misconduct if a higher-level commander determines that the
servicemember’s medical condition is not “the direct and substantial contributing cause” of the misconduct.61
Though a medical discharge may seem like the obvious choice in Mr.
Gonzalez’s case, three main factors drive commanders’ decisions to opt for
administrative discharges based on misconduct rather than medical reasons.62 First, misconduct discharges are exponentially faster than medical
58. 10 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(5) (2018). This was not always the case. Prior to 2017, medical
exams were not routinely provided to servicemembers facing discharge. For example, the
Navy did not require a medical exam or screening for a servicemember separating in lieu
of facing a trial by court-martial. Although the services are now required to provide medical
exams prior to separating servicemembers for misconduct, the services have not adhered to
the statutory requirement. See GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11, at 16–22.
59. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(a). Commanders have discretion to discharge servicemembers for misconduct rather than for medical reasons, presumably to
maintain good order and discipline in their units. Id. at para. 2-2(3)(c).
60. Id. at para. 1-33(b)(1); AR 635-40, supra note 55, at para 4-3; see also U.S. Dep’t of
the Army, Reg. 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, ch. 3 (outlining the disqualifying medical conditions and/or physical defects that disqualify soldiers from further military service).
61. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(b)(1)(a)–(b). The ultimate decision is
reserved for the General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA), usually one of the
highest-ranking commanders assigned to a military installation. The GCMCA must consider
multiple factors before discharging a servicemember for medical reasons. A GCMCA may
only direct that a servicemember be discharged through the medical disability channels
when UCMJ action has not been initiated and when (1) the servicemember’s medical condition is “the direct and substantial contributing cause” of the misconduct or (2) other circumstances warrant disability processing over misconduct processing. Id. If the GCMCA
believes that the circumstances warrant a medical discharge, they must refer the case to a
Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) for a determination of whether the soldier meets criteria
for physical disability out-processing. Id. at para. 1-33(b)(1). If the GCMCA elects not to
refer the case to the PEB, or if the PEB does not ﬁnd that the soldier meets criteria for
disability out-processing, the unit commander may continue discharging the soldier for misconduct. See id. at para. 1-33(b)(3)(b)(1).
62. In Mr. Gonzalez’s case, a number of factors worked against his receipt of a medical
discharge. See Memorandum from Colonel Keith A. Smith, Physical Evaluation Bd., to Dep’t
of Veterans Affs. (Apr. 11, 2014) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). First, misconduct
discharges were faster and simpler for unit commanders to execute because they did not
require the approval of the GCMCA. See AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-19(b)(2)(a).
Second, at least three medical determinations must have been made to show that Mr.
Gonzalez met the criteria for a medical discharge, including determinations by the out-processing medical officer, MEB, and PEB. Finally, even if Mr. Gonzalez met the medical criteria
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discharges. Units are able to expel and replace troops and return to full
end-strength faster if they opt for a misconduct discharge than if they elect
to medically discharge their troops.63 Second, misconduct discharges are
less burdensome on unit leadership and are a convenient way to remove
“problem” troops from service.64 Finally, commanders may be concerned
about the erosion of “good order and discipline” in their units and may
elect a misconduct discharge to address particular problems or to ratchet
up discipline in their units.65
B. The Rise of Administrative Discharges
Administrative discharges have long been closely associated with the
military’s criminal legal system, though they have never been formally recognized as part of it.66 When a servicemember receives judicial or nonjudicial Article 15 punishment, the action is often followed by an administrative
for discharge, the GCMCA could have decided that Mr. Gonzalez’s mental health was not a
direct and substantial cause of the misconduct and chosen not to intervene with a discharge
for misconduct. See id. at para. 1-33(b). Mr. Gonzalez’s case is like many other soldiers’ cases
in that he met the criteria for a medical discharge but the GCMCA declined to intervene.
That is, Mr. Gonzalez was found not medically qualiﬁed during a medical and mental health
out-processing exam and, subsequently, an MEB and PEB determined that he was eligible
for a medical discharge. Id. The GCMCA, however, did not believe that Mr. Gonzalez’s medical condition was a substantial factor in his misconduct and therefore discharged him for
misconduct instead of medical reasons.
63. The pressure to administratively separate troops rather than to diagnose and treat
them is based on military readiness concerns. “Readiness” is a term used to articulate the
preparedness of a unit. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at para. 3. A servicemember undergoing the lengthy medical discharge process will stay on a unit’s rolls much longer than a
servicemember who is discharged for misconduct. Compare id. at enclosure 7, para. 7(a)(1)
(“Processing goals should not exceed 15 working days for the notiﬁcation procedure . . . .”),
with U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1332.38, Physical Disability Evaluation, enclosure 3, para. 1.6.1
(Nov. 14, 1996) [hereinafter DODDI 1332.38] (“All members shall be referred for evaluation within one year of the diagnosis of their medical condition if they are unable to return
to military duty.”). While awaiting medical out-processing, the servicemember may not be
able to perform their regular duties, thus reducing the readiness of the unit. See DODDI
1332.38, supra, at enclosure 3, para. 3.2.1 (“A Service member shall be considered unﬁt
when the evidence establishes that the member, due to physical disability, is unable to reasonably perform the duties of his or her office, grade, rank, or rating . . . .”).
64. See Geoff Ziezulewicz, UCMJ Crackdown: Why Mattis Thinks Commanders Have
Gone Soft on Misconduct, Mil. Times (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/
news/your-military/2018/09/10/ucmj-crackdown-why-mattis-thinks-commanders-have-gonesoft-on-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/MNZ9-GRJA] (“Administrative discipline tends to
be bureaucratically easier and less time-consuming than traditional UCMJ measures to punish misconduct.”).
65. See Jeremy S. Weber, The Disorderly, Undisciplined State of the “Good Order and
Discipline” Term 7–16 (Feb. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“[T]heir answers essentially just equated good order and discipline with unity of
command—in other words, military commanders should be responsible for military justice
decisions because commanders handle important issues in their units.” (footnote omitted)).
66. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 76 (noting that in the late nineteenth
century, the military began expanding the types of discharges beyond honorable and dishonorable to permit a “more nuanced assessment of conduct” and that these administrative
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discharge.67 For example, an administrative discharge is routinely issued
subsequent to a court-martial conviction when the servicemember’s sentence does not include a punitive discharge.68 In misconduct cases not involving a court-martial, such as if the servicemember received a series of
counseling letters and an Article 15, a discharge is often the final administrative action.69 Despite the close relationship between administrative discharges and punitive action, discharges are rarely discussed in plea
negotiations even though the parties are fully aware that pleading to criminal charges almost always results in a discharge.70 DOD maintains that administrative discharges are not punitive.71 As stated in DOD regulations,
administrative discharges promote the readiness of the military and provide
a means to evaluate the suitability of servicemembers based on their ability
to meet required performance, conduct, and disciplinary standards.72
Recent trends show an increase in the military’s use of administrative
discharges.73 Between 2007 and 2017, the number of courts-martial declined
discharges were made available to commanders without resort to courts-martial or judicial
process).
67. See Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice: Unintended Consequences of Military
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. Rev. 115, 137 (2007) (“An Article 15 or summary courtmartial conviction for drug use or possession generally results in an administrative discharge
from the military, but does not trigger the same collateral consequences as a parallel misdemeanor or felony drug conviction in the civilian court system.”).
68. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at paras. 5.48–5.52 (recommending OTH
discharge characterizations for a broad array of ill-deﬁned misconduct such as a pattern of
misconduct, discreditable involvement with military or civil authorities, conduct prejudicial
to good order and discipline, civilian convictions, commission of serious offenses, and sexual assault and requiring discharges in certain cases); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, § 572, 126 Stat 1632, 1754 (2013)
(explaining that the Secretary of each military department must ensure that policies conform with the removal of members of the Armed Forces when the member has received a
ﬁnal offense, even if it is not a punitive discharge); DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 2, para. 2(f) (“[E]nlisted Service members who are convicted of a covered sexual
offense and are not punitively discharged are processed for administrative separation in
accordance with section 572(a)(2) of Reference (c), as described in the procedures of this
instruction.”).
69. See, e.g., 7th Bomb Wing Legal Off. & 7th Bomb Wing Pub. Affs., Article 15 and
Discharge Actions, Dyess A.F. Base (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.dyess.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/Article/1151399/article-15-and-discharge-actions/ [https://perma.cc/JMF3-QKC9]
(reporting administrative disciplinary action and discharges for March 2017).
70. Jeff A. Bovarnick, Plea Bargaining in the Military, 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 95, 96 (2014)
(“After a lengthy discussion with his defense counsel, the soldier now realizes that based on
his crimes, his career in the military is essentially over. The soldier’s primary concern is
limiting his jail time.”).
71. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3 (“Prior service activities,
including records of conviction by court-martial, records of absence without leave, or commission of other offenses for which punishment was not imposed will not be considered on
the issue of characterization.”).
72. Id. at para. 3(a).
73. See Jeremy R. Bedford, Other Than Honorable Discharges: Unfair and Unjust
Life Sentences of Decreased Earning Capacity, 6 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Affs. 687, 721–22
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by nearly 70%.74 Nonjudicial Article 15 punishment declined by almost
40%.75 Experts attributed the declines to a variety of factors, including
commanders’ preference to discharge rather than seek justice, an
institutional focus on prosecuting resource-intensive rape and sexual
assault crimes, and an overall decline in the commission of serious offenses.76 Meanwhile, the number of administrative discharges has continued to rise. Since World War II, the percentage of servicemembers who
receive OTH discharges has increased fivefold, from about 1% of all
veterans with characterized discharges during the World War II era to 5.8%
of veterans in the post-9/11 era.77 VA has denied services to roughly 6.5%
of veterans who have served since 2001, or about 125,000 veterans to
date.78
The increase in administrative discharges has drawn the ire of military
leadership.79 In a 2018 memo, Secretary of Defense James Mattis reminded
commanders of the power of the judicial system. He instructed commanders to choose the “harder right over the easier wrong” and not default to
less burdensome administrative actions to instill discipline in American

(2021) (suggesting that commanders are resorting to OTH discharges rather than courtsmartial as a means of redressing misconduct).
74. Evan R. Seamone, James McGuire, Shoba Sreenivasan, Sean Clark, Daniel Smee &
Daniel Dow, Moving Upstream: Why Rehabilitative Justice in Military Discharge Proceedings
Serves a Public Health Interest, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health 1805, 1808 tbl.1.1 (2014) (reporting
a decline in court-martial cases tried between the Vietnam War era and the Global War on
Terrorism era); Ziezulewicz, supra note 64.
75. Ziezulewicz, supra note 64.
76. Id.; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No.
114-328, div. E, §§ 5001–5542, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894–968 (2016) (providing various reforms
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice); Meghann Myers, Here’s What You Need to Know
About the Biggest Update to UCMJ in Decades, Mil. Times (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.
militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/01/15/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-thebiggest-update-to-ucmj-in-decades/ [https://perma.cc/A6A8-WMFZ] (discussing the Military
Justice Act of 2016, a law that signiﬁcantly changed the court-martial process with the intention of aligning it with federal district court procedures, all while maintaining due process
protections for defendants).
77. Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 43. During the World War II
Era, which spanned from 1941 to 1945, approximately 1% of veterans with characterized
discharges, or about 70,686 out of 6,894,169 servicemembers, received OTH discharges. Id.
During the post-9/11 Era, spanning from 2002 to 2013, approximately 5.8% of veterans with
characterized discharges, or about 103,581 out of 1,790,316 servicemembers, received OTH
discharges. Id.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Ziezulewicz, supra note 64; see also Eugene R. Fidell, Where Have All the Cases
Gone?, Glob. Mil. Just. Reform (May 22, 2014), https://globalmjreform.blogspot.com/
2014/05/where-have-all-cases-gone.html [https://perma.cc/5N7L-99H5] (discussing the
decline of courts-martial over the last ﬁfty years); Aaron Mehta, Mattis Wants Commanders
to Rely More on UCMJ for Disciplinary Problems, Mil. Times (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.
militarytimes.com/news/2018/08/14/mattis-wants-commanders-to-rely-more-on-ucmj-fordisciplinary-problems/ [https://perma.cc/3E4C-97GL] (discussing how former Secretary
of Defense James Mattis wished to see a more aggressive use of the military justice system).
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forces.80 Although Secretary Mattis recognized the danger of blurring administrative and criminal procedures, his motives were misplaced. The increase in LTH discharges and its effect on the health and wellbeing of
veterans should be of far greater concern to military leadership than fears
about soft criminal justice practices. Military leaders must start addressing
the collateral consequences of their actions and stop downplaying the devastating effects of LTH discharges.
II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING THE
EFFECTS OF ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS TO MILITARY DISCHARGES
The criminal legal system, with its stigmatizing labels and disproportionate impact on people of color, offers a useful framework for examining
military discharges. Scholars have developed a rich body of literature addressing the collateral consequences of involvement in the criminal legal
system.81 First, this Part examines the legal consequences of arrests and
convictions and explores the redemption-focused approaches to reducing
their impact on economic opportunities and family stability. Then it compares the collateral consequences and redemption-focused approaches of
the criminal legal system to those of the military discharge system. These
similarities particularly focus on the stigmatizing effects of adverse
discharges.
A. The Criminal Legal System: Collateral Consequences and Redemptive
Approaches
1. Collateral Consequences. — In the criminal context, collateral consequences refers to the legal constraints placed on individuals with criminal
80. Memorandum from James Mattis, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the
Mil. Dep’ts, Chiefs of the Mil. Servs., Commanders of the Combatant Commands 1 (Aug.
13, 2018), https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1534283120.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MCF5-8XST]. Declines in UCMJ action stem from commanders’ preference for less bureaucratic and time-consuming administrative disciplinary methods. Commanders have often complained that UCMJ action reduces military readiness because it
requires considerable attention from military leadership, often removes the accused, victims,
and witnesses from their regular duties, affects unit morale, and takes extensive time for resolution. See Bovarnick, supra note 70, at 97 (stating that the “time required by other ‘outside’
members of the court-martial process” like the “witnesses, bailiffs, escorts, and most importantly panel members” is a factor in the plea-negotiation process); Ziezulewicz, supra note 64.
81. See e.g., Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, §§ 5:1, 5:5; Gabriel J.
Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional
Directions, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 233, 233 (2018) [hereinafter Chin, Collateral Consequences
and Criminal Justice] (explaining the debilitating legal and societal effects of criminal convictions); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104–
05 (2013) [hereinafter Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence] (describing the formal
and informal effects of collateral consequences related to criminal convictions); Pinard,
Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 461 (exploring how collateral consequences in
the U.S. criminal justice system impede an individual’s life and ability to reintegrate with
their community after their incarceration).
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records in the communities to which they return.82 Formal consequences
include those mandated through laws or regulations, such as limitations
on accessing housing, employment, and public beneﬁts, as well as voting
restrictions.83 Informal consequences refer to the “social” consequences
of a criminal conviction, or those that do not attach by virtue of a legal
norm but exist because of the perceived negative implications of criminal
convictions.84 Examples of informal consequences are vast, and include
landlords and employers who use criminal history as a screening device,
friends and family who endure secondary stigma as a result of their association with convicted individuals, and the secondary effects of imprisonment, such as an increased risk of sexual or physical assault and decreased
access to healthcare.85 Predictably, the combination of formal and informal consequences has created a permanent underclass of primarily minority individuals who are excluded from society and who are more likely to
be stopped, ticketed, arrested, charged, sentenced, and incarcerated than
any other class of individuals in the United States.86

82. See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 n.13 (referring
to “civil death” as the condition in which a convicted offender loses all political, civil, and
legal rights); Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 478 (noting that collateral
consequences have been referred to as “civil death”); Michael Pinard, Reﬂections and
Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1213,
1214–15 (2010) (framing the extensive collateral consequences problem as a national
crisis).
83. See Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 474.
84. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 5:5; Alfred Blumstein &
Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background
Checks, 47 Criminology 327, 339–40 (2009); Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, supra note 81, at 1104–05; Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 963, 974 (2013) [hereinafter Pinard, Criminal Records]; Mary
Swanton, Background Bias: EEOC Steps Up Pressure on Employers That Reject Applicants
Based on Criminal Records and Credit Scores, Inside Counsel (Apr. 1, 2010), https://
www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=222715238 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (condemning the widespread use of criminal records to discriminate against
people of color).
85. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, supra note 81, at 1108–09.
86. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84, at 967–68; see also Nora V. Demleitner,
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing
Consequences, 11 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 153, 153 (1999) (noting that “upon release from
prison or discharge from non-incarcerative sentences, many [individuals] ﬁnd themselves
internally exiled . . . [and] saddled with restrictions that exclude them from major aspects
of society”); Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, Prison
Pol’y Initiative (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https:
//perma.cc/8ZLJ-GATY] (describing a recursive incarceration trend where “[a]t least 1 in
4 people who go to jail will be arrested again within the same year”). In 2020, approximately
2 million people were conﬁned in jails or prisons, up from about 500,000 in 1980.
Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 237. The increase in
incarcerations was in large part due to the War on Drugs and many jurisdictions’ “zerotolerance” policies. About 75 million Americans have criminal records. Id. at 239. About
one-third of all individuals in the United States can expect to be arrested by age twenty-
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Collateral consequences are legally imposed by federal, state, and local laws in hundreds of jurisdictions across the United States.87 These laws
make many individuals ineligible for certain jobs, occupational licenses,
subsidized housing, public beneﬁts, and civil rights, from the right to vote
to the right to possess ﬁrearms.88 Despite their deleterious effects, courts
have held that many collateral consequences are not so restrictive as to
constitute punishment and thus are not subject to the Fifth Amendment
prohibition against double jeopardy or the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and that they do not violate ex
post facto prohibitions.89 Further, courts have reasoned that people with
convictions do not constitute a suspect class under the equal protection
doctrine, and as long as legislative constraints on such persons pass rational basis review, the constraints remain constitutional.90
three. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84, at 964. In 2015, Black people made up
13.3% of the population but accounted for 26.6% of arrests. Love et al., Collateral
Consequences, supra note 20, § 6:9. In 2010, Black people were arrested for marijuana offenses at a rate of 716 per 100,000 individuals, while white people were arrested for the same
offense at a rate of 192 per 100,000 individuals. Ezekiel Edwards, Will Bunting & Lynda
Garcia, ACLU, The War on Marijuana in Black and White: Billions of Dollars Wasted on
Racially Biased Arrests 17 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁeld_
document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH7N-4TAV] [hereinafter
ACLU, The War on Marijuana]. There were 1,717,064 drug arrests in the United States in
2010. Of these, 889,133 were for marijuana, and 784,021 were for marijuana possession.
Since 2010, marijuana arrests have decreased by 18%, though that trend has stalled. There
were more arrests in 2018 than in 2015, despite the passage of decriminalization laws in a
number of states. See Ezekiel Edwards, Emily Greytak, Brooke Madubuonwu, Thania
Sanchez, Sophie Beiers, Charlotte Resing, Paige Fernandez & Sagiv Galai, ACLU, A Tale of
Two Countries: Racially Targeted Arrests in the Era of Marijuana Reform 7 (2020),
https://www.aclu.org/report/tale-two-countries-racially-targeted-arrests-era-marijuana-reform/
[https://perma.cc/9ZRC-GVHN]. The arrest rate was substantially disproportional even
though statistically both groups use marijuana at similar rates across all age groups. See
Found. for Crim. Just., Nat’l Ass’ of Crim. Def. Laws., Collateral Damage: America’s Failure
to Forgive or Forget in the War on Crime 23 (2014), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment
/4a1f16cd-ec82-44f1-a093-798ee1cd7ba3/collateral-damage-america-s-failure-to-forgive-orforget-in-the-war-on-crime-a-roadmap-to-restore-rights-and-status-after-arrest-or-conviction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9CL-M963] [hereinafter Collateral Damage]. Prison statistics are similarly disturbing. Studies show that one in three Black males and one in six Latino males will
spend time in prison at some point in their lives. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84,
at 968 (comparing this statistic to one in seventeen white males).
87. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 20, at 1791 (“People convicted of crimes
are not subject to just one collateral consequence, or even a handful . . . [i]nstead, hundreds
and sometimes thousands of such consequences apply under federal and state constitutional
provisions, statutes, administrative regulations, and ordinances.”); Love et al., Collateral
Consequences, supra note 20, § 4:1; ACLU, The War on Marijuana, supra note 86, at 11.
88. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 235.
89. Id. at 243.
90. Id. Laws denying beneﬁts based on cost-savings reasons have been upheld under
rational basis review. See, e.g., Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that denial of assistance to convicted felons and registered sex offenders to conserve funds is rational). Denial of licensure and employment for public safety is rational.
See Rinehart v. La. Dep’t of Corr., No. 93-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1, *1 (5th Cir. July 7,
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Collateral consequences can devastatingly impact employment.91 One
survey found that 92% of responding employers performed criminal background checks on at least some job candidates while 73% performed background checks on every candidate.92 The proliferation of collateral
consequences and their effect on employment has caused a number of
organizations to begin tracking their expansion.93 The American Bar
Association (ABA) created a database of more than 44,778 federal and
state collateral consequences, 80% of which limit employment opportunities for those with criminal records.94 Depending on the jurisdiction, various laws prohibit persons with criminal records from serving as nurses,95

1994) (per curiam) (ﬁnding employment prohibition rationally related to safety and security). Laws related to the promotion of public conﬁdence in government or a regulated
industry are rational. See, e.g., DiCola v. Food & Drug Admin., 77 F.3d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (deciding that debarment of convicted felons under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act does not constitute double jeopardy or violate ex post facto clauses). However, categorical disqualiﬁcations have been found to be irrational. See Barletta v. Rilling, 973 F. Supp.
2d 132, 135 (D. Conn. 2013) (ﬁnding that disqualiﬁcation of all persons who have ever been
convicted of a felony who are seeking licensure for precious metals trading is unconstitutional). A criminal defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
defense counsels’ misadvice about collateral consequences or for failing to warn about the
possibility of deportation. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (“[C]ounsel
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea,
and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”); State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 538–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“In
sum, even though predatory-offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea, affirmative misadvice about such consequences may amount to ineffective assistance
of counsel.”).
91. See generally Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of
Mass Incarceration (2007) (chronicling the effects of the “War On Crime” and the subsequent employment consequences of mass incarceration); Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Deﬁning Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 277, 299–300 (2011) (noting that an increase in misdemeanor offense convictions and a decrease in felony convictions has resulted in a net increase in collateral consequences, especially for indigent persons).
92. See Collateral Damage, supra note 86, at 22.
93. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 9:7 (highlighting how organizations such as the American Bar Association and Uniform Law Commission have compiled
and organized laws and regulations in various jurisdictions involving collateral consequences of arrests and convictions).
94. Collateral Consequences Inventory, Nat’l Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/?jurisdiction=&consequence
_category=&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&consequence_type=&durati
on_category=&page_number=1 [https://perma.cc/TVM2-QZDD] (last visited July 28,
2021); see also Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121
Stat. 2534, 2543 (2008) (capturing the collateral consequences of criminal convictions for
criminal offenses in the United States, each of the states and territories, and the District of
Columbia). The ABA database was compiled through a grant awarded by the National
Institute of Justice, an organization that is required by federal statute to gather the data.
95. See, e.g., Md. Code Regs. 10.09.53.03D(10) (2021) (prohibiting individuals convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude or theft, or with any other criminal history that
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teachers, bus drivers,96 social workers,97 and other professionals. Categorical prohibitions against persons convicted of “felonies” or “crimes of
moral turpitude” exclude millions of individuals from employment in a
host of other career ﬁelds.98 With the proliferation of publicly and commercially available criminal records on the internet, applicants’ abilities to
shield their records or to put them in context for a potential employer
have diminished.99
States have drastically different laws regarding the restrictions placed
on individuals with criminal records.100 For example, twenty-one states ban
incarcerated individuals convicted of felonies from voting until they complete their sentences.101 Eleven states disenfranchise individuals with certain felony convictions indeﬁnitely, unless they are pardoned, or impose
waiting periods after the completion of their sentences.102
By contrast, several states and the federal government have adopted
reforms to ease the obstacles presented by criminal records. “Ban-the-box”
laws require employers to “consider a job candidate’s qualiﬁcations ﬁrst—
without the stigma of a conviction or arrest record.”103 As of October 2020,
indicates a risk of harm to patients, from serving as private nurses to individuals younger
than twenty-one).
96. See, e.g., id. 13A.06.07.07C(1)(a) (prohibiting drivers convicted or charged with
crimes of violence or offenses related to driving or minors from operating school vehicles).
97. Ohio Admin. Code 4757-11-01(C)(7) (2021) (making the commission of “a felony
or any crime involving moral turpitude” grounds for revoking a license).
98. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 239–41.
Although there are no general bars to federal employment for people with criminal convictions, there are speciﬁc exclusionary rules for certain career ﬁelds, such as federal law
enforcement, enlistment in the military, and some national service programs such as
AmeriCorps and VISTA. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 2:9. Additionally, persons convicted of sex crimes, drug-related felonies, or offenses involving childvictims may not be employed as childcare providers for federal employees. Id.
99. See Collateral Damage, supra note 86, at 22.
100. See Wayne A. Logan, “When Mercy Seasons Justice”: Interstate Recognition of ExOffender Rights, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2015) (noting that relief provided to exoffenders in one state is not necessarily recognized in other states).
101. Sarale Sewell & Elizabeth Paukstis, U.S. Comm’n on C.R., Collateral
Consequences: The Crossroads of Punishment, Redemption, and the Effects on
Communities 29 (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANN8-T23R]. In some of these states, individuals convicted of felonies lose their right to vote for a period of time after they are released from incarceration,
while they are on parole or probation. Id.; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Felon
Voting Rights (June 28, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/8K9U-XT8L].
102. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 101.
103. Beth Avery & Han Lu, Nat’l Empl. L. Project, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties,
and States Adopt Fair-Chance Policies to Advance Employment Opportunities for People
With Past Convictions 2 (2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-theBox-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-Oct-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T6Y-EWEA]; see
also Jessica S. Henry, Closing the Legal Services Gap in Prisoner Reentry Programs, 21 Crim.
Just. Stud. 15, 22–23 (2008) (describing how legal aid organizations can play a role in helping those with criminal records reintegrate into society). Those laws may, however, prompt
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thirty-six states and 150 cities and counties have adopted various forms of
ban-the-box laws.104 Many jurisdictions have gone beyond ban-the-box by
adopting laws that delay criminal record-related inquiries until after the
ﬁrst interview or a conditional job offer.105 For example, despite its long
history of imposing collateral consequences, Georgia has adopted signiﬁcant reforms that have eased reentry burdens for its residents.106 Until
2015, employers in Georgia’s public and private sectors could lawfully deny
employment to applicants with criminal records, including records of arrests not leading to convictions.107 Through an executive order, thenGovernor Nathan Deal eliminated questions about criminal records from
state employment applications and signed into law a bill that prohibited

some employers to discriminate against Black applicants instead. Amanda Agan & Sonja
Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment 1
(Univ. of Mich. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 16-012, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=2795795 [https://perma.cc/UP8S-FUFX] (“Our results conﬁrm that criminal records are
a major barrier to employment, but they also support the concern that [ban-the-box] policies encourage statistical discrimination on the basis of race.”).
104. Avery & Lu, supra note 103, at 2.
105. Id. at 3; 50 State Comparison: Limits on Use of Criminal Record in Employment,
Licensing & Housing, Restoration of Rts. Project, https://ccresourcecenter.org/staterestoration-proﬁles/50-state-comparisoncomparison-of-criminal-records-in-licensing-andemployment/ [https://perma.cc/QE9S-56ZV] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021); see also, e.g.,
California Fair Chance Act, ch. 789, 3 Cal. Stat. 5976 (2017); New York City Fair Chance Act,
Int. No. 318-A (2015).
106. H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Patrick C. DiCarlo, Collateral Consequences of Arrests
and Convictions: Policy and Law in Georgia 26 (2008), https://www.gjp.org/wpcontent/uploads/Collateral1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2TK-5CXV].
107. See id. at 7 (describing the lack of discrimination protection in Georgia as of
2008). In 1971, then-Governor Jimmy Carter created the Georgia Crime Information Center
(GCIC). While the primary purpose of the database was to serve law enforcement officers,
Georgia and many other states have used these databases to conduct background checks for
purposes other than law enforcement. Background checks have become one of the most
signiﬁcant barriers for individuals with criminal records. See Mary Madden, Michele
Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of
Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 53, 66 (2017). Many agencies have
policies refusing to hire persons with criminal records when the position requires a security
clearance. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 2:9; Chin, Collateral
Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 241. In 2015, President Obama implemented a series of reentry policies aimed at protecting former inmates from employment
and housing discrimination by eliminating rules requiring disclosure of criminal records. A
related problem involves employers’ use of background checks in facially neutral but factually discriminatory hiring practices. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th
Cir. 1972) (ﬁnding that requiring applicants to disclose arrest records had a disproportionate impact on Black people, in violation of Title VII). Title VII prohibits employment practices that adversely affect individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex (including
sexual orientation), or national origin. An adverse effect may be shown by establishing that
a particular hiring practice has a disparate impact on members of a protected class. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018). Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to show
that the practice relates to the job and meets the business necessity exception. See id.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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the refusal or revocation of professional licenses based on felony convictions, unless the felony “directly relates” to the occupation for which the
license is sought or held.108 Georgia also retreated from mandatory public
housing policies that excluded persons with criminal records, opting instead
for policies giving housing authorities discretion to admit applicants with
criminal records or retain tenants who commit crimes during tenancy.109
Unfortunately, new administrations can rescind or amend orders of
previous administrations, and they often reverse course on policies involving
collateral consequences of involvement with the criminal legal system.110 After
Governor Deal’s overhaul of discriminatory employment and housing laws,
newly elected Governor Brian Kemp unveiled plans to ratchet up penalties
for “street gangs” and sex traffickers, and he proposed a budget that would
cut funding for the public defender system and problem-solving courts.111
The constant churn of legislation makes it difficult to catalog regulations governing collateral consequences and inhibits the implementation of effective
long-term strategies to identify and call attention to their use.
Collateral consequences prove insidious for several reasons. First, they
disproportionately affect Black and brown communities.112 The mass arrest, conviction, and incarceration of people of color has been primarily
responsible for these disproportionate effects.113 Second, their expansion
across federal, state, and local jurisdictions has made collateral consequences not only ubiquitous but also hidden.114 The patchwork of discriminatory regulations makes collateral consequences less transparent and

108. Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1-19(q)(1) (2017); see also Bonita Ann Huggins, Note, Give
It To Me, I’m Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia’s Record Restriction Statute to Provide
Ex-Offenders With A Second Chance in the Employment Sector, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267, 281–83
(2017) (“The [ban-the-box] solution, however, merely pushes the problem further down
the hiring timeline rather than eliminating it . . . . Introducing the criminal record to employers at a later stage of the hiring process essentially makes the employer’s ﬁnal decision
of which qualiﬁed applicant to hire.”).
109. Dennard & DiCarlo, supra note 106, at 72. Georgia residents with criminal records
are still subject to federal lifetime bans on receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) beneﬁts. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2018).
110. See, e.g., Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2016.06, 43-12 Md. Reg. 663 (June 10, 2016).
111. Greg Bluestein & Maya T. Prabhu, Kemp Pursues a New Criminal Justice Policy,
Unnerving Critics, Atlanta J.-Const. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state–
regional-govt–politics/kemp-pursues-new-criminal-justice-policy-unnerving-critics/kjbvlg
LsPWnDE2RrWROM5L/ [https://perma.cc/ZM4Z-QP7E]. Governor Kemp also unveiled
plans to more closely track immigrants with criminal records. Id.
112. Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 516–17.
113. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness 179 (2020) (discussing the impact of collateral consequences on African
Americans “churn[ed] . . . in and out of prisons today”); Pinard, Criminal Records, supra
note 84, at 971 (noting that mass incarceration and conviction are separate issues and have
distinct collateral consequences).
114. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247–48
(“[L]aws governing convicted persons are scattered throughout codes and regulations, and
individuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to comb the laws . . . .”).
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more resistant to public scrutiny than clearly deﬁned bodies of law, such
as criminal statutes.115 Third, many courts do not recognize collateral consequences as punishment for constitutional purposes.116 As a practical matter, they may be the most signiﬁcant aspect of punishment. Criminal
defendants are, however, generally not informed about the collateral effects of their pleas.117 Less than 10% of criminal cases reach the trial stage,
meaning that millions of Americans take plea deals without understanding
the impact the convictions will have on the rest of their lives.118 The next
section discusses the diverse and complex strategies adopted by different
jurisdictions to remedy the problem of collateral consequences.119
2. Redeeming Persons Involved in the Criminal Legal System. — The approaches to restoring rights for individuals with criminal records vary
widely across federal, state, and local jurisdictions.120 Approaches to mitigating collateral consequences involve either “forgiving” past crimes
through executive pardon or judicial dispensation, or “forgetting” them
by restricting access to records through record sealing, expungement, vacatur, or other methods.121 Generally, scholars and law reform advocates
115. See id. at 253 (describing how the “piecemeal” development of collateral consequences has shielded legislatures from the need to justify their decisions).
116. See id. at 243 (“Many courts have held that collateral consequences are not punishment and are thus not covered by the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments or the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.” (citation omitted)).
117. See id. at 248 (“[I]ndividuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to
comb the laws and produce a compendium containing all relevant [collateral consequences].”).
But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to inform her client when a guilty plea may result in deportation).
118. See Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, Atlantic (Sept. 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result of plea
bargains—some 94 percent at the state level, and some 97 percent at the federal level. Estimates for misdemeanor convictions run even higher.”).
119. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Susan M. Kuzma, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of
the Pardon Att’y, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-by-State Survey 1 (1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2LY-BU9J] (referring
to the varying state mechanisms to address collateral consequences as “something of a national crazy-quilt”).
120. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 7:1 (“Like collateral consequences themselves, widely varying state restoration mechanisms result in ‘something of a
national crazy-quilt.’” (quoting Kuzma & Love, supra note 119, at 1).
121. See Margaret Love, Josh Gaines & Jenny Osborne, Collateral Consequences Res.
Ctr., Forgiving and Forgetting in American Justice: A 50-State Guide to Expungement and
Restoration of Rights 2 (2018), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/
Forgiving-Forgetting-CCRC-Aug-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX4Z-CTGK] [hereinafter Love
et al., Forgiving and Forgetting] (“[P]olicy-makers are again debating whether it is more
effective to forgive a person’s past crimes (through executive pardon or judicial dispensation) or to forget them (through record-sealing or expungement).”). Expungement technically means to “obliterate” the record, whereas record sealing is a mechanism to limit access
to records. Vacatur is an order to set aside a judgment or annul a proceeding. These mechanisms may have broader or narrower practical effects, depending on the jurisdiction in
which they are employed. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, §§ 5:1, 5:5.
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prefer forgiveness because this, theoretically, restores individuals to their
original legal position before the conviction occurred.122 Forgiveness
mechanisms take different forms depending on the jurisdiction but generally include executive pardons, judicial set-asides, legislative durational
limits, and administrative waiver provisions.123 Proponents of forgiveness
argue that convictions should have an end-point, and that one of the goals
of the criminal legal system should be that individuals graduate from it.124
Record sealing and expungement mechanisms, on the other hand,
do not affect the disabilities related to convictions but rather shield or remove the records, thus reducing the informal consequences and stigma
stemming from criminal databases.125 Even though reform advocates generally favor these mechanisms, some argue that they are too costly and ineffective in both moral and legal terms.126 The legal costs relate to their
sporadic effectiveness. Variances among states as to when records are
sealed or expunged, who retains access to them, and the possibility that
records were disseminated and saved on private servers prior to sealing or
expungement all undermine the goals of these tools.127 Those who oppose
expungement and sealing on moral grounds either believe that the mechanisms absolve society of its obligation to address institutional racism and
subvert open and transparent discussion of the issues or believe that expungement creates a “right to lie.”128 Nonetheless, these mechanisms offer
122. See, e.g., Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 7:1 (discussing
how these programs may have a restorative impact). Pardons relieve individuals of all legal
disabilities and penalties, but do not negate the predicate effect of the conviction or prohibit
its use in subsequent criminal proceedings. See id. § 7:7.
123. Id. § 7:2.
124. See, e.g., id. § 7:1 n.11 (“More than forty years ago, two veteran probation officers
remarked on this phenomenon: ‘We solemnize the offender’s induction into the system.
When he successfully concludes the program, though, we fail to institutionalize his departure correspondingly. It’s fun to catch the ﬁsh but hard to let him go.’” (quoting Bernard
Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big
Lie, 61 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 378, 390 (1970))).
125. Black’s Law Dictionary deﬁnes “expungement of record” as “[t]he removal of a
conviction (esp. for a ﬁrst offense) from a person’s criminal record.” Expungement of
Record, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
126. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 20, at 113 (providing an overview of expungement
and alternatives such as sealing and certificates of rehabilitation); Marc A. Franklin & Diane
Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9
Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 735 (1981); Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and
Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci.
378, 391 (1970) (“It is a profound mistake to mix in with redemptive legislation any provision for concealing the records.”).
127. See Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 126, at 747; Madden et al., supra note 107, at
77 (stating that data is being scraped from publicly available websites and stored for perpetuity); Sarah Esther Lageson, There’s No Such Thing as Expunging a Criminal Record
Anymore, Slate (Jan. 7, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/criminal-recordexpungement-internet-due-process.html [https://perma.cc/5T8N-QQCS].
128. See Jacobs, supra note 20, at 123 (cleaned up) (arguing that expungement authorizes beneﬁciaries to falsely deny arrests and convictions and prohibits employers from
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individuals a relatively accessible and practical solution to address the collateral consequences of their criminal records and provide some relief to
those who suffer from the consequences of institutional racism.
Beginning in the 2000s, interest in collateral consequences experienced a rebirth.129 Between 2004 and 2017, the ABA, Uniform Law
Commission (ULC), and American Law Institute (ALI) issued a panoply
of proposed reforms for the states and federal government to consider.130
Providentially, their approaches shared a few broad principles. First, they
proposed that collateral consequences be identiﬁed and catalogued so
that individuals charged with crimes can assess the impact of their pleas.131
asking about them); Kogon & Loughery, supra note 126, at 391 (arguing that expungement
protects society from confronting its aberrant attitudes).
129. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 1:6. In 2004, President
George W. Bush referenced “second chance[s]” and “a better life” for individuals with criminal records in his State of the Union Address. Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the
Union Address, Wash. Post (Jan. 20, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). In 2010,
the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
that defendants be advised of deportation consequences of their pleas. See 559 U.S. 356,
373–74 (2010) (ﬁnding that Sixth Amendment precedent and the severity of deportation
require counsel to inform defendants of the risk of their deportation during the plea-bargaining process). In 2011, the Department of Justice redoubled their efforts to collect data
on collateral consequences in every U.S. jurisdiction; in 2012, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidance on collateral consequences of
employment. See Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction
Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, U.S. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-cons
ideration-arrest-and-conviction-records-employment-decisions [https://perma.cc/JZY6-V3WK]
(last visited July 27, 2021). In 2014, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
issued an extensive report urging states to address the issue. See generally Collateral
Damage, supra note 86 (reporting on the legal and social barriers that a person faces after
a court-imposed criminal sentence).
130. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 9:2. In 2008, Congress
passed the Second Chance Act, a law that supported various reentry programs for incarcerated individuals. See Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codiﬁed at 34 U.S.C. § 60501
(2018)) (helping formerly incarcerated individuals circumvent collateral consequences to
obtain services but not directly reforming collateral consequence laws); see also Margaret
Colgate Love, Starting Over With a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model
Penal Code, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1705, 1708–17, 1723–25 (2003) (detailing various efforts
to reform collateral penalties); Ronald D’Amico, Christian Geckeler & Hui Kim, Nat’l Crim.
Just. Reference Serv., An Evaluation of Seven Second Chance Act Adult Demonstration
Programs: Impact Findings at 18 Months, at xi–xii (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/251139.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7R8-8XVK]; Pamela K. Lattimore & Christy A.
Visher, Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv., The Multi-Site Evaluation of SVORI: Summary and
Synthesis, at vi–vii (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230421.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/9XPZ-GBR5].
131. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247 (2018);
see also National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Nat’l Inst. of Just.
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/national-inventory-collateral-consequencesconviction [https://perma.cc/A5BA-X3ET]. In 2007, Congress passed the Court Security
Improvement Act that directed the Director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to
create a compendium of collateral consequences in the United States. In concert with the
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Second, they urged the consideration of collateral consequences in criminal prosecutions.132 For example, they proposed that collateral consequences be considered in sentencing, recognizing the broad authority of
courts to hear mitigating evidence.133 Third, they warned that jurisdictions
must carefully consider whether new or existing collateral consequences
actually promote public safety. They recommended an evidence-based approach to considering the link between consequences and risk reduction
laws, rather than relying on perceived assumptions. Finally, they suggested
speciﬁc relief mechanisms for adoption by states and the federal government.134 These mechanisms of relief ranged from consequences in individual cases to broader automatic relief mechanisms based on the
completion of sentences and the passage of time.135
Modern trends favor a combination of judicial and legislative action
to address collateral consequences.136 Some jurisdictions have experimented with court-issued “Certiﬁcates of Restoration of Rights” that relieve all remaining collateral consequences and affirm the full
rehabilitation and good character of individuals with criminal records.137
Based on legislatively determined standards that authorize brief waiting
periods for review and no categorical exclusions, courts review individual
cases, at sentencing or thereafter, to help society assess the risk of
extending beneﬁts to justice-involved individuals. Additionally, many
ABA, the NIJ created an online publicly available database. See Court Security Improvement
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121 Stat. 2534 (2008) (“The Director of the National
Institute of Justice . . . shall conduct a study to determine and compile the collateral consequences of convictions for criminal offenses in the United States.”).
132. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 249. In
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court noted that both prosecutors and defendants can leverage the bargaining power of collateral consequences in charging and plea-bargaining negotiations. Both the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the ALI’s 2017 Model Penal
Code incorporated the Supreme Court’s dicta into their standards and identiﬁed stages in
criminal prosecutions that allow for the consideration of collateral consequences. See
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (noting that collateral consequences can play a crucial role in pleabargaining negotiations).
133. Collateral Sanctions, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_collateral_blk/#2.4/
[https://perma.cc/77ZE-RVHH] (last visited July 27, 2021); see also United States v.
Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (doling out a one-year probation in consideration of the collateral consequences the defendant would face); Uniform Collateral
Consequences Conviction Act (Unif. L. Comm’n 2010); Model Penal Code: Sentencing
§ 6x.02(2), 6x.04 (Am. L. Inst. 2017).
134. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247.
135. See id. at 252 (noting that the ABA, Model Penal Code, and Uniform Collateral
Consequences Act of 2009 all contemplate that rehabilitation may be indicated by the passage of time, completion of a sentence, and criminal history).
136. See Margaret Colgate Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Forgoing: Legislative
Experiments in Restoring Rights and Status, 30 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 231, 232 (2018) [hereinafter Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Foregoing] (noting that an effective strategy for dealing
with collateral consequences requires a more nuanced and practical approach).
137. Id.
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courts facilitate the deferral or dismissal of criminal cases through
problem-solving courts or other programs that steer defendants away from
convictions.138 Most jurisdictions still favor expungements and sealing
laws, though legislatures have generally been hesitant to expand relief
beyond low-level offenses and crimes not resulting in convictions.139
However, a few jurisdictions have adopted progressive expungement
provisions that come close to automatic concealment for minor
offenses.140 For example, California’s Health and Safety Code calls for the
immediate destruction of records involving misdemeanor marijuana
possession arrests for which there were no convictions and the destruction
of records within two years for cases with convictions.141 Petitioners must
still ﬁle a court petition to ensure the destruction of agency records.142
Two states in particular exemplify new approaches to collateral consequences reform. In 2019, New Jersey created a “clean slate” expungement system that eased access for petitioners and authorized the
expungement of all offenses after ten years, with exceptions for the most
serious violent offenses.143 It also began a process for automating expungements rather than requiring individual petitions to the courts.144 In 2018,
Indiana developed a systemic approach to collateral consequences reform
by enacting extensive licensing and employment law aimed at stemming
collateral consequences.145 The law requires licensing boards to list all disqualifying crimes for licensure, and to include only those crimes that directly relate to the duties of the occupation or profession.146 The law also

138. See Kristine A. Huskey, Justice for Veterans: Does Theory Matter?, 59 Ariz. L. Rev.
697, 705 (2017) (noting that veterans treatment courts divert participants from the conventional criminal legal system to specialized dockets where compliance with treatment, rather
than incarceration, drives resolution of the case).
139. See Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Foregoing, supra note 136, at 232 (explaining that judicial relief has rarely reached beyond minor offenses).
140. See id. at 235 (noting that Indiana automatically purges records after a certain
period of time).
141. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11361.5 (2019); see also Gerald F. Uelmen,
California’s New Marijuana Law: A Sailing Guide for Uncharted Waters, 51 Cal. St. Bar J. 27,
75–76 (1976) (offering an early perspective on California’s progressive drug laws, including
its expungement law, and identifying potential issues for litigation).
142. See, e.g., Steve Escovar, Post-Conviction Relief! Health and Safety Code Section
11357(c) Controlled Substance Offense Record of Arrest and Conviction Destroyed
Pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 11361.5!, Escovar L., APC (May 22, 2019), https:
//www.escovarlaw.com/blog/2019/may/post-conviction-relief-health-and-safety-code-se2/
[https://perma.cc/3PPV-PV7J] (noting that the petitioner had to obtain a court order to
ensure the destruction of records).
143. S. 4154, 218th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018).
144. Id.
145. H. 1245, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018).
146. Indiana Restoration of Rights and Record Relief, Restoration of Rts. Project,
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/indiana-restoration-of-rights-pardonexpungement-sealing/#IV_Criminal_record_in_employment_licensing/ [https://perma.cc
/Q3P9-4LKR] (last updated May 25, 2021).
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forbids the use of vague terms such as “crimes of moral turpitude” or
“good character” in licensing determinations, and it forbids consideration
of arrests not resulting in convictions.147 The disqualifying period for listed
convictions was capped at ﬁve years, with consideration for individual petitions at any time.148
Recent studies have shown that mechanisms aimed at reducing the collateral consequences of arrests and convictions are indeed effective.149 One
study examined the effect of judicially issued “certificates of relief” on hiring
practices in Ohio. The certificates lifted occupational licensing restrictions,
limited employer liability for negligent hiring claims, and demonstrated to
employers that the certificate holder had been rehabilitated.150 Researchers
found that certificate holders were three times as likely to receive interviews
as applicants with records but without certificates, and equally as likely to
receive interviews as applicants with clean records.151 Another study examined employment and earning statistics of individuals who had received record clearing interventions at the East Bay Community Law Center’s Clean
Slate Clinic in California.152 The clinic offered post-conviction set-aside and
dismissal interventions for individuals with convictions that did not result in
prison sentences, as well as felony reduction interventions.153 The study
found that clearing interventions increased employment rates for clinic clients by as much as 85% and boosted average earnings by as much as
$6,000.154 More data is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of other record clearing remedies, such as certificates of rehabilitation, expungements,
vacatur, and record sealing, but these studies hold promising results.
B. Discharges: Collateral Consequences and the Failure of Discharge Review
1. Collateral Consequences of Military Discharges. — Although the military does not classify administrative discharges as punitive, they have formal and informal consequences much like those imposed on individuals
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 253
(“Because of the limited judicial review, legislatures have not had to articulate the reasons
for their enactment [of collateral consequence laws] or evaluate their effectiveness or
costs.”).
150. Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certiﬁcates of Relief
as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. Inter Alia 11, 14 (2016).
151. Id. at 19.
152. Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record
Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 29 (2018).
153. Id. at 33. Under California law, individuals convicted of certain infractions, misdemeanors, and felonies not resulting in a prison sentence can petition the court to set aside
and dismiss their convictions. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (2020). Individuals convicted of felonies that do not result in prison sentences may petition the court to
have their felonies reduced to misdemeanors. Id. § 17(b).
154. Selbin et al., supra note 152, at 8.
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with criminal records.155 Many of the formal consequences of LTH discharges involve prohibitions on receiving veterans’ beneﬁts. Veterans who
are most in need of VA beneﬁts, including healthcare, housing, employment, and disability beneﬁts, are generally not eligible to receive them.156
Informally, veterans with LTH discharges face discriminatory practices
when seeking employment and housing, much like the discrimination experienced by individuals with criminal records.157 Veterans must also endure the unique psychological impact of discharge characterizations,
which has its own debilitating effects.158 Despite the technical differences
between discharges and criminal prosecutions, the collateral effects remain predictably the same. Veterans marked with denigrating labels, often
for life, have a reduced chance for successful reentry or reintegration into
civilian society.159
a. Loss of Military Beneﬁts and Career. — Collateral consequences experienced by people involved with the criminal legal system parallel the
collateral consequences for servicemembers with LTH discharges in significant ways. In both cases, collateral consequences are serious and immediate. Incarcerated persons may lose their jobs, homes, access to routine
medical and dental care, and basic civil rights, including the right to vote
and the right to be secure in their personal effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.160 Convictions may extend the abdication of civil
rights beyond any period of conﬁnement.161
For servicemembers, the immediate effects include the loss of military
employment, salary, medical, dental, clothing, commissary, and housing
155. See Bednar, supra note 37, at 2 (ﬁnding that the impact of a dishonorable discharge goes far beyond a loss of important beneﬁts and rights for the concerned party);
Jones, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that “any less than honorable discharge may substantially
hinder the post-service life of its recipient”).
156. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 11 (“In other words,
85% of veterans with bad-paper discharges who applied for some VA beneﬁt have been told
that their service was so ‘[d]ishonorable’ that they forfeited all rights to almost every federal
veteran beneﬁts.”).
157. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 12–13. There is a perception that an offender
whose conduct required a dishonorable discharge designation “deserves” to have a hard
transition back to civilian life. The brand of “bad paper[s]” has been characterized as a “life
sentence” or “a ticket to America’s underclass [and] a bar to leaving it.” Id. at 12.
158. See Scapardine, supra note 48, at 1135–36 (2017) (ﬁnding that an OTH discharge
carries with it a negative stigma that “greatly limits the opportunities for both public and
private civilian employment”).
159. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 21 (“The high rates of
ineligibility have grave consequences for the veterans denied access to the VA, as well as to
society as a whole.”).
160. See Bernice B. Donald & Devon C. Muse, Lifelong Collateral Consequences: The
Modern-Day Scarlet Letter, 68 Drake L. Rev. 707, 708 (2020) (explaining that collateral consequences compound societal issues of social inequity, poverty, and poor health and prevent
individuals who have been previously incarcerated to move forward, even after “paying their
debts” to society).
161. See id.
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beneﬁts, as well as access to all family support services.162 For military members serving away from their state of legal residence, a frequent occurrence
for servicemembers, a discharge also means relocating and establishing
residency in another state or country.163 Skills acquired during service may
not be transferable to the private sector.164 Therefore, a discharge often
means the end of a career for many servicemembers.165 The termination
of beneﬁts and career opportunities are catastrophic for many servicemembers, especially those suffering from mental health issues.166
b. Loss of VA Beneﬁts. — The lingering effects of criminal arrests and
convictions also parallel the long-term consequences of an LTH discharge.
In the mid-90s, federal and state welfare reform resulted in the enactment
of legislation that imposed lifetime bans on public beneﬁts for individuals
convicted of drug-related offenses.167 In the last decade, many states have
opted out of those bans.168 Nonetheless, some states still impose bans or
make the receipt of beneﬁts conditional on drug tests and enrollment in
treatment programs.169

162. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 21–22 (giving an overview of the impact that an OTH discharge can have on a veteran, including increased risk
of mental health conditions and suicide, of becoming involved in the criminal justice system,
and of homelessness).
163. See id. at 22 (“The VA’s restrictive implementation of the Other Than
Dishonorable eligibility standard leaves most veterans with bad paper discharges unable to
access crucial support that could help them ﬁnd stable and secure housing.”)
164. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Veterans are Working, but Not in Jobs That Match Their
Advanced Training, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/us/
politics/veterans-jobs-employment.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Mar. 16, 2020) (indicating that underemployment is one of the biggest issues faced
by veterans returning from combat).
165. Id.
166. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1377 (describing how after a ﬁnding of military misconduct, many individuals are pushed out of service with OTH discharges, which results in
no or reduced beneﬁts, poor job prospects, and societal stigma).
167. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 862a (1996); Crystal S. Yang, Does Public Assistance Reduce Recidivism?,
107 Am. Econ. Rev. 551, 551 (2017).
168. Chesterﬁeld Polkey, Most States Have Ended SNAP Ban for Convicted Drug
Felons, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislators: NCSL Blog (July 30, 2019), https://www.ncsl.
org/blog/2019/07/30/most-states-have-ended-snap-ban-for-convicted-drug-felons.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XHM4-A8YS]; see also Yang, supra note 167, at 554 (concluding that
felons who are provided access to public beneﬁts are less likely to return to prison within a
year).
169. See, e.g., Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, Nat’l Conf.
of State Legislatures (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drugtesting-and-public-assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/TAV9-4H4Y] (listing Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as the states which
have passed legislation regarding drug testing or screening for public assistance
applicants or recipients).
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Veterans with OTH discharges are also banned from receiving benefits.170 VA bars most veterans with OTH discharges from accessing the military’s safety net of benefits that was designed to assist veterans transitioning
out of the military.171 In 1944, in part to aid struggling World War II veterans
returning from service, Congress enacted the G.I. Bill of Rights, the largest
expansion of military benefits in U.S. history.172 The bill provided a myriad
of benefits, including education, housing, healthcare, disability compensation, vocational rehabilitation, burial, pension, retirement, and other benefits and services for veterans.173
Importantly, Congress made the benefits available to all servicemembers discharged “under other than dishonorable conditions.”174 In provisions known as the “statutory bars,” Congress enumerated the dishonorable
conditions under which servicemembers were not eligible to receive benefits.175 The conditions included severe misconduct, such as desertion for
more than 180 days, and discharges ordered pursuant to a general courtmartial.176 VA added its own exclusions, under congressional authority, that
170. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 50 (explaining that “a veteran with an OTH”
discharge due to a 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) violation is barred from “eligibility for any VA health
care beneﬁts”).
171. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40. VA implemented its regulatory bars after
World War II. Prior to World War II, Congress set eligibility requirements that were speciﬁc
to each military conﬂict. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 82, 85. For example,
veterans of the Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and Boxer Rebellion were
required to have an honorable discharge for disability pensions. Veterans with bad conduct
or dishonorable discharges were barred from receiving many beneﬁts, including medical
and burial beneﬁts. Id at 82.
172. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284. Congress
passed the bill to help servicemembers who were drafted and removed from their civilian
jobs. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 73–74 (reviewing the history of the G.I. Bill).
But see Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America 114 (2005) (noting that Black servicemembers received considerably fewer G.I. Bill beneﬁts than white servicemembers).
173. 58 Stat. 284.
174. See Hearings on H.R. 3917 and S. 1767 to Provide Federal Government Aid for
the Readjustment in Civilian Life of Returning World War II Veterans Before the H. Comm.
on World War Veterans’ Legis., 78th Cong. 415 (1944) [hereinafter House Hearings on G.I.
Bill] (statement of Harry W. Colmery, past commander, the American Legion). The legislative history of the bill makes clear that Congress did not want beneﬁts distributed only to
those with an honorable discharge because, as one past commander stated, “[W]e are seeking to protect the veteran against injustice . . . . [W]e are trying to give the veteran the beneﬁt of the doubt, for we think he is entitled to it.” Id.
175. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) (2018).
176. Id. The statute speciﬁes bars to beneﬁts for servicemembers who were discharged
under certain conditions: by sentence of a general court-martial; for conscientious objection, when the servicemember refused to perform military duty or wear the uniform or otherwise comply with lawful orders of a competent military authority; for desertion; for
absence without authority from active duty for a continuous period of at least 180 days if the
servicemember was discharged under conditions other than honorable; by seeking discharge as an alien during a period of hostilities; and for resignation by an officer for the
good of the service.

2021]

DISCHARGED AND DISCARDED

2235

made thousands more veterans ineligible for beneﬁts, including most veterans with OTH discharges.177 These “regulatory bars” include broader
exclusions for “willful and persistent misconduct,” offenses involving
“moral turpitude,” and other minor offenses for which servicemembers
were administratively discharged rather than court-martialed.178 The illdeﬁned terms provide VA with the discretion to exclude additional veterans whose circumstances fall outside of the limited statutory categories deﬁned by Congress.179
VA denies an extensive number of beneﬁts to most veterans with OTH
discharges.180 Veterans with honorable and general (under honorable conditions) discharges receive government-backed home loans, subsidized
housing vouchers, small-business loans, burial benefits, pensions,
disability compensation, comprehensive healthcare, case management
services, rehabilitation services, residential care, compensated work
therapy, employment training, tuition assistance, and telecounseling
services, among other beneﬁts.181 Only veterans with honorable
discharges receive beneﬁts under the Montgomery or Post-9/11 G.I. Bill,
which provided educational assistance to servicemembers and veterans.182
While these beneﬁts help veterans with honorable and general discharges,

177. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2020); Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 106 (“[E]xclusions based on the “other than dishonorable conditions” element have become known as
the “regulatory bars,” referring to the VA regulations that elaborate the term.”).
178. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d).
179. In Camarena v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 565, 567 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 60 F.3d 843
(Fed. Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit addressed
whether VA overstepped its statutory authority in excluding veterans with bad conduct discharges from receiving VA beneﬁts. The Court found that the phrase “dishonorable conditions” gave VA discretion to exclude veterans with other than fully dishonorable discharges,
but stated that Congress clearly intended to exclude only those veterans who committed
misconduct equivalent to the dishonorable standard. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22,
at 103.
180. See VA Beneﬁts for Servicemembers, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
https://www.va.gov/service-member-benefits/#va-benefits-you-can-use-during-and-after-service
[https://perma.cc/33HG-EHAA] (last updated July 29, 2021) (providing information on
various beneﬁts for servicemembers). VA distinguishes between veterans with honorable,
general, and OTH discharges when distributing VA beneﬁts. Veterans with honorable and
general discharges are eligible to receive most VA beneﬁts, except for educational beneﬁts,
which VA only grants to honorably discharged veterans. Servicemembers whom VA deems
ineligible to receive beneﬁts may request reconsideration on a case-by-case basis. See
Applying for Beneﬁts and Your Character of Discharge, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., https://
www.beneﬁts.va.gov/beneﬁts/character_of_discharge.asp [https://perma.cc/TZ8K-BZDY]
(last updated Dec. 10, 2020) (listing beneﬁts available to veterans with honorable versus
general discharges).
181. See Veterans Beneﬁts Administration Fact Sheets, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
https://beneﬁts.va.gov/BENEFITS/factsheets.asp#BM4/ [https://perma.cc/3L77-LELH]
(last updated July 26, 2021); see also Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 42–51 (describing the
various beneﬁts available to veterans and the types of discharges required to receive such
beneﬁts).
182. 38 C.F.R. § 21.9520(a)(2).
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veterans with OTH discharges have the most difficulty transitioning to
civilian society and need them the most.183
c. Ineligibility for VA Healthcare. — Persons with felony convictions
have notoriously limited access to healthcare.184 Similarly, healthcare is
one of the most signiﬁcant VA beneﬁts that is denied to veterans with LTH
discharges. Generally, veterans with OTH discharges do not qualify for
healthcare unless they prove that their illness is related to service.185 Even
then, VA will only treat a veteran’s service-connected disability but will not
provide general healthcare.186 Yet in response to the mental health discharge crisis reported by the GAO in 2017, VA implemented regulations
to provide emergency mental health services to any veteran for up to
ninety days, including inpatient, residential, and outpatient treatment services, regardless of their discharge characterization.187 Additionally,
Congress passed the Honor Our Commitment Act of 2018 that extended
healthcare to a limited number of veterans with OTH discharges.188 Under
the Act, veterans who served at least 100 days on active duty and deployed
in a theater of combat operations or in support of combat operations, or
who are survivors of military sexual trauma, are eligible for extended mental and behavioral healthcare, regardless of their discharge.189 While these
efforts are laudable, they are limited in scope and exclude thousands of
veterans who do not meet the criteria.190 Further, VA often misinterprets
183. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 7–8 (indicating exclusion
from the VA due to OTH discharge can mean the denial of a variety of benefits that help in
the transition back into civilian life, including housing, healthcare, and employment support).
184. See Jay Hancock, Out of Jail, Uninsured, Ex-Inmates Face Health Care Challenges,
Balt. Sun (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-ex-inmate-health
care-20160424-story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating that thousands
of people who were previously incarcerated leave prison with mental illness or chronic
health issues, but live without access to healthcare).
185. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.360(a) (allowing health beneﬁts to be given “to certain former
service persons with administrative discharges under other than honorable conditions for
any disability incurred or aggravated during active military, naval, or air service in line of
duty”).
186. Id.; see also Veterans Legal Clinic at the Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harvard L. Sch.,
Veterans Legal Servs., Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP, Turned Away: How VA
Unlawfully Denies Health Care to Veterans With Bad Paper Discharges 2 (2020)
https://www.legalservicescenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Turn-Away-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4BRQ-25J5] (noting that every person seeking VA healthcare is entitled to apply,
but VA offices often exclude veterans completely from services they could be eligible for on
the basis of their discharge paperwork).
187. See 38 U.S.C. § 1702 (2018); 38 C.F.R. § 17.34.
188. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 258, 132 Stat. 348,
826 (2018) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
189. Id.
190. See Ledesma, supra note 23, at 191 (commenting that while there is an administrative process that allows servicemembers who received a “bad paper” discharge to challenge that characterization in order to seek beneﬁts, the processes are incredibly lengthy
and difficult to navigate, leaving many servicemembers without healthcare beneﬁts).
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its own regulations and denies care to qualifying veterans, who tend to lack
access to legal counsel or knowledge of their legal rights to challenge these
denials.191
d. Ineligibility for VA Housing Programs. — Just as criminal background
checks often disqualify persons with criminal records from obtaining housing, veterans with OTH discharges have limited housing options.192 VA offers an array of housing and residential treatment programs for its
veterans, but again, the programs are limited to veterans with honorable
or general discharges.193 Veterans with OTH discharges represent 25% of
the total homeless veteran population and account for 5% of all separated
servicemembers.194 At the end of 2020, under the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development-VA Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH)
program, HUD and VA provided permanent housing and supportive services to 100,570 homeless veterans and their families.195 Since the program
is based on eligibility for VA healthcare, it excludes most homeless veterans
with OTH discharges.196 Additionally, many states offer VA-subsidized assisted-living and skilled-nursing facilities for veterans, but only to those
who were discharged under honorable conditions.197
e. Exclusion from State and Federal Education and Employment Programs
for Veterans. — Veterans with “bad paper” who are transitioning into the
workforce face the same dearth of employment and education opportuni-

191. See Brennan, supra note 21 (indicating that VA staff members routinely misapply
the law and misinterpret military records, thus preventing eligible veterans from receiving
treatment).
192. See Fair Housing for People With a Criminal History, Fair Housing Ctr. for Rts. &
Rsch., https://www.thehousingcenter.org/resources/criminal-history/ [https://perma.cc
/DC2R-3XNE] (last visited July 27, 2021) (explaining that criminal background checks are
often used as a screening criterion for rental housing to determine qualified applicants,
resulting in continued penalty for those with a criminal history even after they leave prison).
193. Id.
194. Adi V. Gundlapalli, Jamison D. Fargo, Stephen Metraux, Marjorie E. Carter,
Matthew H. Samore, Vincent Kane & Dennis P. Culhane, Military Misconduct and
Homelessness Among US Veterans Separated From Active Duty, 2001–2012, 314 JAMA 832,
832 (2015) (noting also that the “[i]ncidence of homelessness was signiﬁcantly greater for
misconduct vs normal separations at ﬁrst VHA encounter (1.3% vs. 0.2% . . . ), within 1 year
(5.4% vs. 0.6% . . . ), and 5 years (9.8% vs. 1.4% . . . ) of ﬁrst VHA encounter”).
195. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-VA Supportive Housing
(HUD-VASH) Program, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., https://www.va.gov/homeless/hudvash.asp [https://perma.cc/27RP-7LJQ] (last updated Mar. 30, 2021).
196. HUD-VASH Eligibility Criteria, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, https://www.va.gov/ho
meless/hud-vash_eligibility.asp [https://perma.cc/GZ66-MVPX] (last updated Feb. 19, 2019).
197. See, e.g., Admissions Eligibility, Charlotte Hall Veterans Home, https://www.char
hall.org/content/admissions/eligibility.cfm [https://perma.cc/7UZH-2XR8] (last visited
Aug. 26, 2021) (noting that in order to be eligible for admission to Charlotte Hall Veterans
Home, the individual must be “a Maryland veteran who served full time active duty in the
U.S. Armed Forces, other than active duty for training, and was discharged or released under
honorable conditions” (emphasis added)).
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ties as people with criminal convictions upon their reentry into the workforce.198 While states and federal agencies offer transition programs
speciﬁcally tailored for veterans, these programs also follow VA’s eligibility
determinations and exclude veterans with LTH discharges. For example,
under the Illinois Veterans’ Grant program, honorably discharged veterans receive tuition assistance at all Illinois state colleges, universities, and
community colleges.199 Illinois’ “Troops to Teachers” program assists servicemembers who are pursuing careers in public school teaching.200 Military members who served during wartime or overseas receive a one-time
“Service Bonus.”201 In Texas, disabled veterans receive tuition waivers at
in-state colleges and free driver’s licenses.202 These innovative programs
are tremendously helpful to veterans transitioning from military service,
but their exclusionary policies limit their effectiveness.
Veteran employment programs intended to protect veterans and to
facilitate their transition into the workforce are generally not available to
veterans with OTH discharges. One of the most comprehensive federal
employment programs, the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Act (USERRA), was intended to prevent employment discrimination against servicemembers entering or reentering civil employment after military service.203 For example, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
saw record numbers of Reserve Component servicemembers mobilized for
federal service, often for multiple tours of duty.204 These servicemembers
left and returned to civilian jobs multiple times over a period of years.205
USERRA protects these servicemembers from employment discrimination,
but not veterans with OTH discharges.206 Section 4304 of the Act excludes
servicemembers with OTH separations and punitive discharges from its
protections.207 As such, even a servicemember with multiple enlistments of
198. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 13–14 (“[S]tatistics on the connection between post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and crime leave much to be desired . . . [but]
enough data now exist[s] to conclude that the military has essentially criminalized mental
illness . . . .”).
199. Illinois Veteran’s Beneﬁts, MilitaryBeneﬁts.info, https://militarybeneﬁts.info/
illinois-veterans-beneﬁts [https://perma.cc/5DPG-ZTSC] (last visited July 27, 2021).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 103353, sec. 2, § 4301, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150 (1994) (codiﬁed at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4331 (2018)).
USERRA added additional protections to an earlier law that provided workplace protections
for veterans. See S.J. Res. 286, 76th Cong. (1940); Karin, supra note 40, at 137 (explaining
that the goal of USERRA was to help servicemembers integrate into civilian life after military
service and foster participation in the workforce).
204. Karin, supra note 40, at 138.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 157 (“[L]abor standards terminate with (1) a dishonorable or bad conduct
discharge; [or] (2) an other than honorable conditions (OTH) separation . . . .”).
207. 38 U.S.C. § 4304(2).
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honorable service who is discharged during his last enlistment with an
OTH discharge is denied protections under the Act.208
The “veterans’ preference” offered by federal, state, and private sector employers is a valuable employment tool, but it is often reserved only
for veterans discharged under honorable conditions.209 Veterans’ preferences attempt to remedy unemployment and reintegration problems experienced by many veterans.210 Historically, these preferences were offered
by public sector employees. In the last decade, a number of states have
expanded veterans’ preferences to include private sector employment, but
again, these too bar veterans with OTH discharges.211
Even when veterans are not explicitly excluded from employment programs because of their discharge characterization, they are often excluded
because of discriminatory hiring practices. There are no per se Title VII protections for veterans if employers use a veteran’s discharge status to deny
them employment.212 While the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has taken the position that the use of criminal history
questions in hiring may constitute unlawful race or national origin discrimination under either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories, it is
not clear that veterans have these same claims.213 It is also unknown whether
employers may violate the Americans with Disability Act by using discharge
status in hiring, given the disproportionate impact of discharges on veterans with mental illness.214
208. See Tootle v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 559 F. App’x 998, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding
that the appellant’s three honorable discharges for previous periods of service did not provide standing for his USERRA claim after the appellant was discharged with a dishonorable
discharge during his last period of service).
209. See Michael D. Sutton, Comment, Forging a New Breed: The Emergence of
Veterans’ Preference Statutes Within the Private Sector, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1081, 1090 (2014)
(explaining that some statutes regarding preference status include requirements regarding
residency, honorable discharge, or disability status).
210. See Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 254 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding that preferential treatment in veteran hiring does not violate equal protection principles when legislatures provide a rational basis for the preference).
211. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-3-302(b)(1) (2013); Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1-13 (2014); Idaho
Code § 65-502(17) (2014); Sutton, supra note 209, at 1090 n.59 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)
(2012)).
212. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018) (omitting
protections for veterans); Karin, supra note 40, at 184 (“ [T]here is no per se violation of
Title VII if an employer uses criminal history to make an employment decision . . . .”); Alyssa
Peterson & Arjun Mody, How Employers Illegally Discriminate Against Veterans With LessThan-Honorable Discharges, Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (May 29, 2018), https://harvard
crcl.org/how-employers-illegally-discriminate-against-veterans-with-less-than-honorabledischarges [https://perma.cc/M895-A5W7] (“After receiving a less-than-honorable discharge, veterans cannot access most state and federal veterans’ benefits. Moreover, a number
of employers have gone so far as to adopt blanket bans on hiring veterans with bad paper.”).
213. See Karin, supra note 40, at 184 (“Of relevance to USERRA’s statutory OTH exclusion,
the EEOC’s updated guidance confirms that not all use of criminal history is illegal . . . .”).
214. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat.
327, 329 (“It is the purpose of this Act— (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
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A few states have become acutely aware of the disparate impact of
OTH discharges on people of color and disabled individuals and have
taken steps to protect veterans from disclosing an unfavorable discharge
status.215 In 2018, Connecticut became the ﬁrst state to formally recognize
that discrimination based on discharge status can violate protections based
on race.216 The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities (CHRO) issued a fact sheet warning employers of blanket
policies that may run afoul of antidiscrimination laws since data shows that
adverse discharges are disproportionately issued to servicemembers of
protected classes.217 Illinois and Wisconsin have also adopted statutory
protections against employment discrimination of veterans with OTH
discharges.218
Despite the efforts of a few states, the disclosure of military discharge
status for a variety of purposes remains commonplace in civilian society.
Veterans must disclose their DD-214 to obtain employment, beneﬁts, or to
show proof of military service.219 The document’s conventional use is striking, given that DD-214s include other sensitive information in addition to

mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”).
215. See Karin, supra note 40, at 185 (indicating that twenty-four states and over onehundred cities and counties have instituted ban-the-box laws).
216. Veterans Legal Services Clinic, IAVA-CT: Protecting Veterans With Bad Paper
From Employment Discrimination, Yale L. Sch., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/
clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/iava-ct-protectingveterans-employment-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/W6B7-SYRJ] (last visited July 27,
2021).
217. See Conn. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities, Guide to Nondiscrimnation
in Hiring and Employing Connecticut Veterans: Questions and Answers for Employers,
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/chro/veteranemployerqaguidancepdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/
L6TZ-3W4F] [hereinafter Human Rights Report] (last visited July 27, 2021) (“Policies that
discriminate against veterans who received a less-than-honorable discharge from the military may also subject you to liability under current federal and state law, as a result of their
disparate impact on veterans of color, LGBT veterans, and veterans with disabilities.”). The
Commission also published a “know your rights” page, alerting veterans to the employer
liability under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts.
& Opportunities, Know Your Rights, https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/chro/knowyourrights
veteranspdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2UK-3FCF] (last visited July 27, 2021); see also Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(2019); Peterson & Mody, supra note 212 (describing Connecticut’s
model for addressing the adverse impacts of biased policies discriminating based on
discharge status).
218. See 68 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-102(A) (2016) (prohibiting discrimination based on
“unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with employment”); Wis. Stat.
§§ 111.32(3), 111.322, 111.335 (2016) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on
military service, discharge characterization, or military criminal record).
219. Joe Wallace, DD214: Understanding Character of Discharge, MilitaryBeneﬁts.info,
https://militarybenefits.info/character-of-discharge/ [https://perma.cc/U559-WD46] (last
visited July 27, 2021) (explaining the uses for the DD-214); see also Kevin Lonergan, Service
Discharges; DD Form 214 Explained, U.S. Army (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.army.mil/
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discharge characterizations, such as social security numbers, birthdates,
home addresses, and dates of service.220 It is not clear why military discharge characterizations must be included on the DD-214, other than to
make them available for employment and beneﬁts purposes. The fact that
the military has not addressed this issue is an indication of its blindness to
the collateral consequences of its characterizations.
f. Moral Injury. — The psychological impact of an OTH discharge,
especially on those suffering from mental illness, is as equally overlooked
as the psychological impact of incarceration on people involved with the
criminal legal system.221 Researchers have used the term “moral injury” to
describe experiences in which individuals “perpetrate, fail to prevent, or
bear witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.”222 This type of injury is exempliﬁed by Vietnam War veterans, many
of whom endured traumatic combat experiences and later returned to the
United States to face scorn by the public and national media.223 Some
Vietnam veterans and other servicemembers have reported experiencing
moral injury in both combat and noncombat roles. For example, moral
injury may be experienced when a servicemember is ordered to shoot the
driver of a quickly approaching vehicle whose intentions are unknown,
seeing wounded civilians and being unable to assist, being exposed to human remains, feeling a rush or enjoyment during war or killing, or making
article/73343/service_discharges_dd_form_214_explained/ [https://perma.cc/NZ33-JMS4]
(noting that “most individuals and employers want to see an Honorable Discharge”).
220. Joe Wallace, How to Read DD Form 214, MilitaryBeneﬁts.info, https://military
benefits.info/how-to-read-dd214/ [https://perma.cc/488B-FVKZ] (last visited Aug. 18, 2021).
221. Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 257, 257 (2013) (“The experience of being locked in a cage has a psychological effect
upon everyone made to endure it. No one leaves unscarred.”).
222. Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash,
Caroline Silva & Shira Maguen, Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A
Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29 Clinical Psych. Rev. 695, 697 (2009)
(cleaned up); see also Shira Maguen & Brett T. Litz, Moral Injury in Veterans of War, 23
PTSD Rsch. Q. 1, 1 (2012) (deﬁning moral injury as “an act of serious transgression that
leads to serious inner conﬂict because the experience is at odds with core ethical and moral
beliefs”); Jonathan Shay, Moral Injury, 31 Psychoanalytic Psych. 182, 184 (2014) (describing
a form of moral injury experienced by service members who act in violation of their own
ideals, ethics, or attachments in war).
223. Approximately 2.7 million Americans served in the Vietnam War (1961–1975),
and about 58,000 were killed. DOD discharged thousands of servicemembers for minor misconduct who had experienced traumatic events and who were later diagnosed with mental
health disorders. The Vietnam War is particularly associated with moral injury because of
the social and political volatility of the conﬂict, and because of the well documented atrocities that were committed against civilians as the U.S. struggled to adapt to guerilla warfare
style of ﬁghting. As a result of the bloody conﬂict and the moral ambiguity of the war, many
Vietnam era veterans have experienced prolonged postwar symptoms of medical, psychological, and spiritual distress including moral injury. See Lindsey K. Slaughter, Psychologist,
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., Richmond, Virginia VA Hospital, Community Hospices: Moral
Injury in Vietnam Veterans, Presentation to Capital Caring Hospice (June 12, 2019) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review).
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decisions that affect the survival of others.224 In extreme cases, it may involve being ordered to break the rules of engagement, believing that commanders gave negligent orders or did not adequately support troops, or
mistreating civilians or captured enemy combatants, as well as incidents
involving death or harm to civilians, such as killing children, witnessing or
perpetrating violence or sexual abuse on civilians, or disrespecting dead
bodies.225 These actions may violate moral principles “that are rooted in
religious or spiritual beliefs, or culture-based, organizational, and groupbased rules about fairness and the value of life.”226
The symptoms of moral injury are often masked as behavior problems. Studies show that conﬂict between morally challenging situations
and personally held beliefs or standards can cause servicemembers to experience negative self-attributions, guilt, shame, changes in ethical attitudes and behavior, difficulty with forgiveness, and a reduced ability to trust
others.227 Manifestations of moral injury include self-harm, “poor self-care,
alcohol and drug abuse, severe recklessness, and parasuicidal behavior.”228
In 2013, these new perspectives of trauma were recognized in an updated
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM5), which is the official listing of psychological disorders used by healthcare
professionals, including VA.229 The DSM-5 moved PTSD from the anxiety
disorders section to the trauma and stressor-related disorders section of
the manual.230 Feelings of guilt, shame, and self-deprecation were added
224. Craig J. Bryan, AnnaBelle O. Bryan, Michael D. Anestis, Joyce C. Anestis, Bradley
A. Green, Neysa Etienne, Chad E. Morrow & Bobbie Ray-Sannerud, Measuring Moral Injury:
Psychometric Properties of the Moral Injury Events Scale in Two Military Samples, 23
Assessment 557, 557–58 (2016) [hereinafter Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury].
225. Victoria Williamson, Neil Greenberg & Dominic Murphy, Moral Injury in UK Armed
Forces Veterans; A Qualitative Study, 10 European J. of Pyschotraumatology 1, 3–7 (2019). This
study included qualitative interviewing of six veterans who reported moral injury and four clinicians who had treated veterans with moral injury. The data from the interviews was analyzed
using thematic analysis. The researchers found that after experiencing events which caused
moral injury, veterans experienced consistent and significant psychological distress, including
flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, emotional numbness, suicidal ideation, negative
appraisals of themselves and others, and exhibiting risky behaviors or self-neglect.
226. AnnaBelle O. Bryan, Chad E. Morrow, Neysa Etienne & Bobbie Ray-Sannerud,
Moral Injury, Suicidal Ideation, and Suicide Attempts in a Military Sample, 20 Traumatology
154, 154 (2014).
227. Id. at 154–55; see also Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at
557–70 (discussing the effects of violating moral standards on a servicemember’s emotional,
mental, and social wellbeing).
228. Litz et al., supra note 222, at 701.
229. See The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 309.81 (5th ed.
2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (noting DSM-5’s categorizing of PTSD as a trauma and stressorrelated disorder rather than an anxiety disorder); DSM-5 Measures, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans
Affs., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/dsm-5_validated_measures.asp [https:/
/perma.cc/67G8-2K5H] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
230. See Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 557–58. In 1980, the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) added PTSD to its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-III). It was a landmark moment for servicemembers that marked
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to the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under a new cluster referred to as “negative alterations in cognition and mood.”231 This classiﬁcation was an important step in understanding the data showing marked increases in PTSD
among servicemembers and veterans.232
Despite VA’s recognition of this unique kind of trauma and its relationship to PTSD, the military continues to discharge servicemembers for
misconduct rather than treat their mental illness.233 LTH discharges perpetuate servicemembers’ feelings of guilt and shame, increase the chance
of reexperiencing moral injury, and reduce the chance for self-forgiveness
and recovery.234 Researchers have identiﬁed factors for measuring moral
injury and have discovered associations between these factors and those
used to measure self-injurious thoughts and behaviors.235 VA reported that,
in 2017, about seventeen veterans committed suicide per day.236 More studies are needed to understand the association between moral injury and
suicide, the second-leading cause of death for servicemembers, though
moral injury is clearly a risk factor for suicide.237
The military must be cognizant that discharge characterizations involve more than administrative personnel matters and indeed affect the
lives of those who have served long after they have departed the battleﬁeld.
VA must be particularly cognizant of the healthcare and housing needs of

the start of a major body of neuroscience and clinical research that continues to evolve and
shape our understanding of trauma and warﬁghting today. The recategorizing of PTSD as a
trauma and stressor-related disorder marked another important moment in the evolution
of the medical community’s understanding of the disorder. See Anushka Pai, Alina M. Suris
& Carol S. North, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the DSM-V: Controversy, Change, and
Conceptual Considerations, Behav. Scis., Mar. 2017, at 7, 7 (noting “considerable research
has demonstrated that PTSD entails multiple emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, anger) outside
of the fear/anxiety spectrum, thus providing evidence inconsistent with the inclusion of
PTSD with the anxiety disorders”).
231. Pai et al., supra note 230, at 4 (“The DSM-5 increased the number of symptom
groups [for a PTSD diagnosis] from three to four and the number of symptoms from 17 to
20.”).
232. Inst. of Med., Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Military and
Veteran Populations: Final Assessment 41 (Nat’l Acads. Press ed., 2014) (noting that data
from DOD and VA show marked increases in PTSD among servicemembers and veterans).
233. GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11 (noting that “91,764 servicemembers were
separated for misconduct from ﬁscal year 2011 through 2015; of these servicemembers,
57,141 - 62 percent - had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to their separation with
PTSD, TBI, or other certain conditions that could be associated with misconduct”).
234. Litz et al., supra note 222, at 701 (ﬁnding that servicemembers with moral injury
tend to suffer in isolation, creating a feedback loop in which they withdraw from others due
to feelings of shame).
235. Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 155.
236. Off. of Mental Health & Suicide Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 2019
National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report 3 (2019), https://www.mentalhealth.
va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2019/2019_national_veteran_suicide_prevention_annual_report
_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9U5-H52Q].
237. See Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 154.
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veterans during the current COVID-19 pandemic.238 Jeremy Travis, former
chief of the National Institute of Justice, famously said of the thousands of
Americans sent to prison that “they all come back.”239 Likewise, veterans
with LTH discharges all come back seeking opportunities to reenter civilian society. Rather than providing them with the tools they need to recover
from the experiences of war, they are met with exclusionary policies that
create barriers to their reentry and successful transition to civilian
society.240
2. The Failure of Discharge Review. — Discharge review boards are the
primary means of obtaining relief from LTH discharges.241 However, as
one board president recently noted, “the [Navy Discharge Review Board]
is a review board, not a clemency board.”242 Review boards were never intended to consider post-service conduct and evidence of rehabilitation,
and the standards governing discharge review do not support the consideration of such evidence.243 As a result, thousands of veterans with LTH
discharges continue to be placed in a semicriminal status with no hope of
reclaiming their honor or shedding their stigmatizing discharge
characterizations.244
a. The Legal Basis for Discharge Upgrade. — Veterans may petition their
service branch to upgrade their discharges, though the process is notoriously slow and the majority of those who apply for upgrades are denied
relief.245 Discharges may be changed or corrected through administrative
238. Amy Palmer, How COVID-19 Shifted the Way We Support Veterans, Mil. Times
(May 19, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/19/howcovid-19-shifted-the-way-we-support-veterans/ [https://perma.cc/R29E-EY29] (explaining
how COVID-19 cut off much of the volunteer support which helps to assist the functioning
of VA hospitals, has prevented visitors to many of the patients within VA hospitals, and has
increased the severity of the housing crisis already faced by homeless veterans).
239. See Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, U.S.
Dep’t of Just., Sent’g & Corr.: Issues for the 21st Century, May 2000, at 1, 1 (“If current
trends continue, this year more than half a million people will leave prison and return to
neighborhoods across the country . . . .”).
240. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40 (describing the difficult transition for veterans with LTH discharges who are barred from receiving VA health care).
241. Character of Discharge Types, Senior Veterans Serv. All., https://www.veteransaid
beneﬁt.org/correcting_military_discharge.htm [https://perma.cc/CCU2-PD3C] (last visited Aug. 17, 2021).
242. Robert Powers, President, Navy Discharge Rev. Bd., Sec’y of the Navy, Council of
Rev. Bds., NDRB Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at 11 (June
7, 2019) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (cleaned up).
243. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552–1553 (2018).
244. Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that administrative discharges such as the “Other Than Honorable” designation place veterans in an eligibility limbo which they cannot escape).
245. Veterans can wait anywhere between twelve to thirty months for a decision. Many
veterans are not aware of their right to discharge review. VA Disability Claims and Appeals
Process Timeline, Chisholm Chisholm & Kilpatrick Ltd (Apr. 30, 2019), https://ccklaw.com/blog/va-disability-claims-and-appeals-process-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/52KQAKGM]. Those that do are overwhelmed by the process and rules for applying. The boards
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boards whose decisions are reviewable in federal court.246 Each service
branch has two boards that review discharge petitions.247 Discharge review
boards (DRBs) have the authority to change the character of discharge or
narrative reason for a discharge,248 except for discharges that were either
issued pursuant to the sentence of a general court-martial or not issued
within the DRB’s 15-year statute of limitations.249 Boards for the correction
of military records (BCMRs) have the same powers as the DRBs but also
have the authority to reinstate veterans to active duty, authorize retirement, and issue backpay.250 Generally, petitioners must seek review at the
DRB before appealing to the BCMR or federal courts.251
Both review boards have similar standards of review. The DRB may
take action on a servicemember’s discharge based on “equity,”252 while the
BCMR may take action if there is an “injustice.”253 The standards of equity
and injustice are generally the same and apply under three regulatory circumstances: (1) if the policy that led to the veteran’s discharge has now
been changed to such a degree that the veteran would not have been discharged as the policies currently stand; (2) if, at the time the veteran was
discharged, the discharge was inconsistent with the standards of discipline

began a campaign in 2014, pursuant to a DOD mandate, to educate veterans on the discharge review process. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of
Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts attach. 2 (Sept. 3, 2014) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Hagel Memo] (directing the boards to create a comprehensive public
messaging campaign); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub.
L. No. 114-328, § 533, 130 Stat. 2000, 2121 (2016) (codiﬁed at 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2018))
(requiring the boards to publish their decisions on the internet).
246. Conn. Veterans Legal Ctr., Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual 12 (2011),
https://ctveteranslegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Connecticut-Veterans-Legal-CenterDischarge-Upgrade-Manual-November-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/9343-64BN] [hereinafter
Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual] (listing the standards of review for discharge review
boards).
247. See id. at 10. The names of these boards differ among the services, though the
laws and procedures are generally the same. See id. at 11. Section 523 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 added a “ﬁnal” DOD-level review board for
servicemembers who exhaust their administrative appeal rights at their respective service
branch DRBs and BCMRs. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553a (2018); National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 116-92, § 523, 133 Stat. 1198, 1354 (2019) (codiﬁed as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1553a (2019)). The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the
Secretary of the Air Force with oversight of the new board, officially titled the DOD
Discharge Appeal Review Board (DARB), though the board hears appeals from every service
branch. See Memorandum from David L. Norquist, Deputy Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
to Senior Pentagon Leadership, U.S. Dep’t of Def. 1 (Jan. 29, 2021) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
248. 32 C.F.R. § 70.8 (2020).
249. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a).
250. Id. § 1558; see also Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual, supra note 246, at 10.
251. See Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual, supra note 246, at 10.
252. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b)–(c).
253. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1).
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in military service of which the veteran was a member; and (3) if the discharge was inequitable or unjust based on evidence relating to (A) quality
of service or (B) capability to serve.254 Petitioners may also seek review
based on clemency, but only if their discharge was issued pursuant to the
order of a court-martial.255
The DRB and BCMR may also take action on grounds of “error” and
lack of “propriety.”256 Error and impropriety fall under two regulatory circumstances: (1) an error of fact, law, procedure, or discretion occurred,
and the error was prejudicial to the veteran during the discharge process;257 and (2) a change in policy by the military service of which the applicant was a member, made expressly retroactive to the type of discharge
under consideration, requires a change in the discharge.258 Changes based
on error or impropriety are rare and, when invoked, typically involve retroactive policy changes.259
In 2014, as a result of heavy lobbying efforts by Congress and Veterans
Service Organizations (VSOs) as well as a federal lawsuit ﬁled on behalf of
Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were seeking relief from LTH discharges,260 then- Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued a policy memo
254. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c). The majority of discharge upgrade petitions are based on allegations of inconsistent standards or inequalities rather than on policy changes. For example, after the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy, the military invited gay and lesbian
servicemembers to petition for discharge upgrades during a speciﬁed window of time, a rare
occurrence. See Dave Philipps, Ousted as Gay, Aging Veterans Battling Again for Honorable
Discharges, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/us/gayveterans-push-for-honorable-discharges-they-were-denied.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (detailing that many veterans were given LTH discharges, barring them from
veterans’ beneﬁts and government jobs and/or other employment, for being gay).
255. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(f)(2), 1553(a). Clemency generally refers to a change in a discharge or dismissal adjudged by courts-martial. But see Memorandum from Robert L.
Wilkie, Under Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (July 25, 2018),
https://arba.army.pentagon.mil/documents/Wilke20180725JusticeEquityClemency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FKB-3L8T] [hereinafter Wilkie Memo] (calling for the review boards to
consider clemency in all cases, not only discharges or dismissals pursuant to courts-martial).
256. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b).
257. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b)(1)(i) (explaining that “prejudicial error” means that there is
a “substantial doubt” that the discharge would have remained the same if the error had not
been made).
258. Id. § 70.9(b)(1)(ii).
259. There are a number of reasons why the boards generally do not upgrade discharges based on error. First, errors must be prejudicial, and boards do not often ﬁnd prejudice. Second, the boards are generally boards of equity, and the members are not
persuaded by technical errors. Finally, the formalization and inclusion of a Judge Advocate
Corps in every service has reduced error rates. Cf. Alexander Holtzoff, Administration of
Justice in the United States Army, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 1, 9 (1947) (noting how the dearth of
military lawyers during World War II contributed to inequities in the military justice system).
260. Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14cv260(WWE), 2014 WL 7794807, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 18,
2014). In 2014, students at the Veterans Clinic at Yale Law School ﬁled a class action lawsuit
against the Navy on behalf of less-than-honorably discharged veterans suffering from PTSD
and other mental illness. All ﬁve individual plaintiffs named in the case received discharge
upgrades from the Board of Correction for Navy Records, and the class certiﬁcation was
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regarding discharge petitions raising mental health issues.261 The “Hagel
Memo” stated that liberal consideration would be given to veterans petitioning for discharge relief based on mental health reasons, including
PTSD or related conditions.262 Subsequent memoranda provided guidance for implementing liberal consideration and expanded its scope to
include matters related to sexual assault and sexual harassment.263
Notably, liberal consideration did not change the legal standards for
an upgrade. Rather, it gave the boards the additional authority to liberally
dismissed. See Monk v. Mabus, Yale Law School Veterans Legal Services Clinic, https://law.
yale.edu/studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services
-clinic/monk-v-mabus [https://perma.cc/PG88-DXZA] (last visited July 27, 2021) (revealing
that “[f]ive Vietnam combat veterans and three veterans’ organizations ﬁled a class action
lawsuit . . . seeking relief for tens of thousands of Vietnam Veterans” that received an otherthan-honorable discharge after developing PTSD during the war); see also Andrew
Tilghman, DOD Willing to Reconsider Discharges of Vietnam Vets With PTSD, Mil. Times
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/03/
dod-willing-to-reconsider-discharges-of-vietnam-vets-with-ptsd/ [https://perma.cc/BQ64-A
JW6] (explaining that DOD had agreed to “reconsider the bad-paper discharges for thousands of Vietnam-era veterans” after the federal lawsuit was ﬁled).
261. See Hagel Memo, supra note 245, at 1.
262. Id. The Secretary of Defense regulates the military at the discretion of the
President. See 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018). The Secretary of Defense’s policy memoranda carry
the weight of military orders or directives. See What Are the DOD Issuances?, Wash.
Headquarters Servs., https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/general.html [https://perma
.cc/WND2-JNDA] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021) (“Directive-type memoranda signed by the
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense are policy-making documents. A directive-type
memorandum shall be converted into a DoD Directive or DoD Instruction within 180 days,
unless the subject is classiﬁed with limited distribution or is material of limited or temporary
relevance.”).
263. Memorandum from A.M. Kurta, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness,
U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (Aug. 25, 2017), https://dod.defense.gov/
portals/1/documents/pubs/clarifying-guidance-to-military-discharge-review-boards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V29A-E79C] [hereinafter Kurta Memo]; see also Memorandum from
Brad Carson, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys
of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (Feb. 24, 2016), http://veteransclinic.law.wfu.edu/ﬁles/2017/09/
Carson-Memo.pdf[https://perma.cc/VXB5-M7RD]. The Kurta Memo articulated four
questions for petitioners seeking review: (1) Does the veteran have a condition or experience that may excuse or mitigate the discharge; (2) Does that condition exist or did the
experience occur in service; (3) Does that condition or experience actually excuse or mitigate the discharge; and (4) Does the condition or experience outweigh the discharge. The
most contested issue in the Kurta Memo is whether the condition or experience excuses or
mitigates the discharge. The Kurta Memo provides favorable guidance to veterans on this
question, stating that “[c]onditions or experiences that may reasonably have existed at the
time of discharge will be liberally considered as excusing or mitigating the discharge.” Kurta
Memo, supra, at attach. 2. The Kurta Memo questions provided much needed guidance to
petitioners, most of whom are unrepresented. Tom Turcotte, Mil. L. Task Force of the Nat’l
Law.’s Guild, Basics of Discharge Upgrading 4 (2020), https://dd214.us/reference/
DischargeUpgrade_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UU3-F2SR] (“Most of [the Military
Discharge Review Board’s] caseload involves unrepresented applicants or those represented
by traditional veterans’ organizations that often employ a very route [sic] approach . . . .”).
The policy was codiﬁed at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) for the DRBs and at 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) for
the BCMRs.
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construe facts in such a way that recognized the myriad circumstances that
may establish evidence of mental illness and its inﬂuence on servicemembers’ behavior.264 For example, it allowed for relaxed evidentiary standards
in cases involving mental illness, such as permitting veterans’ own statements to establish illness and to provide a nexus between the illness and
the unlawful behavior.265 Evidence of misconduct or changes in behavior,
including requests for transfer, deterioration in work performance, substance abuse, episodes of depression, panic or anxiety attacks without an
identiﬁable cause, and unexplained economic or social behavior changes,
could be used to infer a mental health condition.266 It also allowed for the
consideration that mental health conditions often remain undiagnosed
until years after service and are frequently unreported in service.267 Overall, liberal consideration allowed the boards to exercise “greater leniency
and excusal from normal evidentiary burdens” and instructed them not to
expect the same burdens of proof for injustices committed at a time when
the military had a limited understanding of mental illness and its behavioral effects.268
b. The Failure of Substantive Rules for Discharge Upgrade. — Despite
DOD’s laudable policy, liberal consideration did not produce the results
that veterans’ advocates had hoped to obtain. For example, for the ﬁrst
two quarters of 2019, almost ﬁve years after implementation of the Hagel
Memo policies, the NDRB reported grant rates near preliberal consideration levels, hovering around 23% for petitions involving PTSD, TBI, and
other mental health conditions.269 The Army fared better, with grant rates
around 60%.270

264. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1388 n.199 (explaining “liberal consideration requires the boards to consider the facts liberally and with an understanding of how facts may
establish a mental health condition and a nexus between a mental health condition”).
265. See Kurta Memo, supra note 263, at attach. 2. The memo stated that evidence may
come from sources other than a veteran’s service record, including a victim’s statement in
a sexual assault case, “rape crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, physicians, pregnancy tests, tests for sexually transmitted diseases, and statements from family
members, friends, roommates, co-workers, fellow servicemembers, or clergy.” Id. at attach. 4.
266. Id.
267. Id. at attach. 4.
268. Id. at attachs. 3–4.
269. See Boards Statistics CY2019, Boards of Review Reading Rooms, U.S. Dep’t of the
Air Force, https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2019.htm (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (last updated Oct. 3, 2021) (reporting Navy board statistics for the ﬁrst two quarters
of 2019). See generally Wherry, supra note 22, at 1387 n.197 (discussing recent grant rates
for the Navy Discharge Review Board). For the same period, the NDRB reported granting
26.9% of petitions involving military sexual trauma, and 12.2% of petitions not involving
mental health or military sexual trauma.
270. See Boards Statistics CY2019, supra note 269 (illustrating that the Army Discharge
Review Board (ADRB) has granted 57.9% of the 126 mental health claims it has
adjudicated).
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The mixed results invited a pair of class action lawsuits against the
Army and Navy alleging that the class of veterans, those with LTH discharges suffering from mental health disorders, had been denied liberal
consideration in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act.271 The lawsuits
blamed the review boards for misapplying the evidentiary rules and for
failing to follow special procedures for applicants with mental health problems as mandated in the DOD memos described above.272 In April 2021,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut approved a settlement agreement between the Army and a class of veteran plaintiffs that
allowed for the automatic reconsideration of thousands of veterans’ discharge upgrade applications that were denied between 2011 and 2020.273
In October 2021, the same court approved a similar settlement agreement
in the Navy lawsuit.274
c. Inadequate Standards for Discharge Review. — While the class action
lawsuits addressed the improper application of standards, the standards
themselves remain woefully inadequate. Neither equity nor propriety, the
two bases for upgrade of an administrative discharge, provide a means for

271. See Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110, 123 (D. Conn. 2018) (stating that Navy and
Marine Corps veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to today and were (1)
discharged with an LTH status, (2) failed to receive upgrades on their discharge status, and
(3) have PTSD, properly form a class under Federal Rule 23 (b)(2)); Kennedy v. Esper, No.
16CV2010 (WWE), 2018 WL 6727353, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018) (certifying a class of
Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan era
who were discharged with an LTH service characterization, had not received discharge upgrades, and suffered from PTSD or PTSD-related conditions).
272. See Manker, 329 F.R.D. at 115 (granting class certiﬁcation to a group of plaintiffs
“challenging the NDRB’s characterization upgrade decision-making procedures, which are
allegedly in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s due
process protections”); Kennedy, 2018 WL 6727353, at *2–4 (denying defendant’s challenge
to an injunction “ordering ADRB to take into consideration, follow, and apply the Hagel
Memo and medically appropriate standards for PTSD into the applications for a change in
discharge status”).
273. See Kennedy v. McCarthy, No. 3:16-cv-2010 (CSH), 2020 WL 7706604, at *1 (D.
Conn. Dec. 28, 2021); Federal Court Approves Major Nationwide Settlement for Post-9/11
Army Veterans, Yale L. Sch. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/federalcourt-approves-major-nationwide-settlement-post-911-army-veterans/ [https://perma.cc/M
TZ3-NNG6] (explaining that the agreement’s conditions include permission for veterans
who ﬁled petitions between 2001–2011 to reapply; requirements that the Army articulate
why an applicant does not qualify for an upgrade and that the ADRB inform applicants
about legal representation; telephonic personal appearances; and training for ADRB members); see also Press Release, Kennedy v. McCarthy, Yale L. Sch., https://law.yale.edu/
studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/
kennedy-v-mccarthy/ [https://perma.cc/2CUU-FQZX] (last visited July 28, 2021) (explaining
that suit was ﬁled, through Yale’s Veterans Legal Services Clinic, on behalf of about 50,000
less-than-honorably discharged Iraq and Afghanistan era Army veterans with PTSD and
other mental health related conditions).
274. See Manker v. Del Toro, No. 3:18-cv-00372 (CSH), slip op. at 2, (D. Conn. Oct. 12,
2021).
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considering evidence related to relief from collateral consequences. Propriety applies only to errors of fact, law, and procedure, or changes in policy relevant to the period of service in question.275 Certainly, legal and
procedural arguments can and should be made challenging LTH discharges of servicemembers suffering from mental illness. Yet given the discretion and complexities involved in discharging servicemembers for
misconduct rather than the underlying medical reasons, boards usually do
not make ﬁndings of error based on legal or procedural grounds in these
cases.276
Equity provides a broader basis for discharge upgrade than propriety,
though it provides no relief for collateral consequences. Under the equity
standard, the boards may determine that relief is warranted based on the
consideration of the petitioner’s service record “and other evidence presented to the DRB viewed in conjunction with the factors listed in [the]
section.”277 The factors listed in the section include awards and decorations, combat service, and other equitable factors directly related to the
service period under review, but do not include any factors related to postservice conduct or evidence of rehabilitation.278 The only reference to
post-service evidence is in a provision allowing for the consideration of
prior military service or outstanding post-service conduct that “provide[s]
a basis for a more thorough understanding of the performance of the applicant during the period of service which is the subject of the discharge
review.”279 The regulations simply do not contemplate changes in discharge status based upon evidence of collateral consequences or the consideration of post-service conduct or rehabilitation unrelated to the time
service period under review. Discharge review focuses on a narrow period
of time in the past and not on what veterans have accomplished or experienced after service.
d. Reluctance to Embrace Liberal Consideration. — Liberal consideration
has provided the best opportunity for the review boards to look beyond
the service period in question and to consider post-service evidence. Liberal consideration invites the review boards to examine evidence obtained
long after service to determine whether a servicemember’s misconduct
was related to a mental health condition. Servicemembers may submit lay
and expert testimony developed after service to support their claims that
previously undiagnosed conditions contributed to their misconduct. To

275. See 38 C.F.R. § 70.9(b) (2020).
276. See Powers, supra note 242, at 2–3 (highlighting the few ﬁndings of error or
change in medically-related cases).
277. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c)(3) (2020).
278. Id. § 70.9(c) (listing equitable factors such as service history, rank, awards and
decorations, letters of commendation, combat service, promotions, length of service, prior
military service, convictions by civil authorities while a servicemember, family and personal
problems, arbitrary or capricious action, and discrimination).
279. Id. § 70.9(j).
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offset the difficulties of this endeavor, liberal consideration provides relaxed standards for the consideration of post-service evidence of mental
illness and its relationship to service misconduct.280 Despite the ﬂexibility
provided by these standards, the boards have clung to their rigid preliberal
consideration standards and have not consistently applied liberal consideration in cases that warrant its application.281
e. Conﬂict With Longstanding Discharge Review Policy. — There are several reasons for boards’ reluctance to embrace liberal consideration. First,
the policy is at odds with longstanding rules governing discharge review,
such as the presumption that discharges were properly executed.282 Evidentiary rules put the burden of proving errors or inequities on veterans.283 The boards presume that discharges were properly executed unless
a petitioner rebuts the presumption.284 Further, the boards apply a “presumption of regularity” in all discharge cases.285 That is, the boards presume regularity in the conduct of government affairs unless there is
substantial and credible evidence to rebut the presumption.286 This evidentiary presumption can be difficult for veterans to overcome, particularly when the evidentiary record is incomplete. There is no formal
discovery process for discharge review. Veterans must request records from
their military service branch and VA. The records are often incomplete,
especially for reservists and National Guard servicemembers.287
For example, in a case before the Army BCMR, a veteran received an
Article 15 for disrespecting two noncommissioned officers and destroying
government property, all of which occurred on the same occasion.288 He
was subsequently given an OTH discharge based on a “pattern of misconduct,” a discharge typically reserved for servicemembers with a pattern of
280. See Kurta Memo, supra note 263, at attachs. 1–4 (providing guidance to relevant
authorities on how to handle applications for upgrading discharges related to mental health
conditions).
281. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1386–95.
282. DODDI 1332.28, supra note 63, at enclosure 3, para. 2.12.6 (“There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental affairs. This presumption shall be applied
in any review unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”).
283. 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(e)(2) (2020); id. § 70.8 (b)(12)(vi).
284. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1392 (“[T]he Board . . . rejected the veteran’s request . . . [w]hile not explicit, the why and how was likely the presumption of government
regularity and the Veteran’s failure to overcome the presumption.”).
285. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211; see also Peter Michael Gerdes, A Bit of History on the
Presumption of Regularity, PrawfsBlawg (Jan. 14, 2019), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2019/01/a-bit-of-history-on-the-presumption-of-regularity.html [https://perma.
cc/MEQ7-DTT8] (highlighting that the presumption of regularity is an evidentiary presumption that people act appropriately, and the party claiming this presumption bears the
burden to disprove).
286. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211.
287. Army Bd. for Corr. of Mil. Recs., ARAB No. AR20140016725 (May 21, 2015) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
288. Id.
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minor disciplinary infractions over a period of time.289 The veteran petitioned the Army BCMR for a discharge upgrade because his military record lacked sufficient evidence to support the basis for discharge.290 In its
decision denying an upgrade, the Army BCMR conceded that the petitioner’s record was void of the speciﬁc facts and circumstances concerning
the events which led to his discharge from the Army.291 However, because
the petitioner’s official discharge document, the DD-214, listed “pattern
of misconduct” as the basis for discharge, the Army BCMR explained that
they could presume that there were other instances of misconduct upon
which the discharge was based even though they were absent from the
record.292
f. Deference to Commanders. — Second, boards routinely defer to the
discharge decisions of commanders who have “boots on the ground” experience and are in the best position to make decisions affecting their servicemembers.293 Deference to commanders is a perennial doctrine in the
profession of arms that strongly inﬂuences both military and civilian decisionmakers.294 Its inﬂuence on the review boards is no exception.295 The
boards view their role as a limited one, like appellate courts reviewing
lower court decisions using an arbitrary and capricious standard. The
boards will not second-guess commanders’ decisions unless there are clear
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference
Doctrine, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 161, 162 (2000) (stating that lower federal courts “sometimes misstate, misapply, or erroneously fail to apply the military deference doctrine”); Jeremy S.
Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline?, 66 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123,
129 (2017) [hereinafter Weber, Whatever Happened] (explaining that “[t]he military justice system places commanders in the central disciplinarian role” ).
294. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (stating that “courts must
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest”); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94
(1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”); Kalyani Robbins, Framers’ Intent and Military Power: Has
Supreme Court Deference to the Military Gone Too Far?, 78 Or. L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s “deference to the military” doctrine as the basis for numerous rejections of challenges to military action).
295. See Michael Ettlinger & David F. Addlestone, Military Discharge Upgrading and
Introduction to Veterans Administration Law 1S/1 (2d ed. 1990), https://ctveteranslegal.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MilitaryDischargeUpgrading_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JDC9-FCK5] (“[A]gencies . . . are much more prone to assume that the veteran’s command’s actions were legally proper and that it exercised its discretionary powers correctly in
characterizing the veteran’s discharge”); Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets Into Trouble”:
Servicemembers, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1709, 1770
(2017) (noting that military law reﬂects a substantial deference to decentralized command
decisions that are rarely overturned by post-hoc administrative review).
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inequities or improprieties.296 Because of this stalwart concept of military
governance, the review boards are hesitant to broaden their concept of
equity.
The boards are especially reluctant to interfere with the services’ decisions concerning the good order and discipline of their servicemembers.297 Each service branch has its own disciplinary issues that may impact
the assignment of discharge characterizations. For example, a service with
drug or alcohol problems may want to increase punitive measures for substance use offenses. As such, it may issue OTH discharges or even conduct
courts-martial for marijuana offenses, while another branch issues general
discharges for the same offense.298 These disparities are sanctioned under
the discharge review regulations. To prove inequity, a veteran must show
that “the discharge was inconsistent with standards of discipline in the
Military Service of which the applicant was a member.”299 Each service
branch, as well as the individual components within each service branch,
is within its authority to issue varying discharges depending on the needs
and preferences of the individual unit. The boards are aware of these individual needs and are wary of interfering with the services’ disciplinary
strategies.
The composition of the boards also helps to explain their reluctance
to interfere. DRBs are comprised of no fewer than three commissioned
and noncommissioned officers.300 The BCMRs are comprised of senior executive civil servants from various components of DOD, including some
who have previous military service.301 Few, if any, of the voting members
296. See 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2020) (“There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there is
substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”).
297. See David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, A White Paper on American Military
Justice: Retaining the Commander’s Authority to Enforce Discipline and Justice 1 (2020),
https://www.court-martial-ucmj.com/files/2020/07/White-Paper-on-Military-Justice-Reforms
-2020-w-App.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ES-AHJV] (stating that transferring prosecutorial
discretion away from commanders will undermine their authority to maintain good order
and discipline); Weber, Whatever Happened, supra note 293, at 161 (stating that commanders were thought to require a free hand to rule their commands with near-absolute
authority).
298. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attach. 2 (“Similarly situated Service members sometimes receive disparate punishments. A Service member in one location could
face court-martial for an offense that routinely is handled administratively across the
Service.”).
299. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c)(2) (emphasis added).
300. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2018) (“The Secretary concerned shall . . . establish a
board of review, consisting of not fewer than three members, to review the discharge or
dismissal . . . of any former member of an armed force . . . or, if he is dead, his surviving
spouse, next of kin, or legal representative.”); see also 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(b)(1) (“As designated by the Secretary concerned, the DRB and its panels, if any, shall consist of ﬁve members.”). Commissioned and noncommissioned officers are selected by the service secretaries
and generally have served at least ﬁve years in the military.
301. 10 U.S.C. § 1552; see also 32 C.F.R. §§ 581.3(c)(1), 723.2(a), 865.1.
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are lawyers or judges. Given the narrow constraints of equity and impropriety and the deference traditionally afforded to discharging commanders, especially in matters related to the discipline of troops, boards are
unlikely to substitute their own judgment for that of commanders. While
the consideration of liberal standards, collateral consequences, and postservice rehabilitation may all be relevant and essential to the successful
reintegration of less-than-honorably discharged veterans, these considerations often do not carry weight with board members and do not override
the decisions of commanders.
g. Merit-Based Discharge Review. — Finally, the boards are cognizant of
the merit-based reasons for awarding discharge characterizations and will
not interfere with the meritocracy of administrative discharges. Discharge
characterizations are assigned based on standards of conduct and performance in service.302 Honorable discharges are awarded to servicemembers
who have performed adequately and are denied to those who have not.303
The merit-based approach to discharges is evident in the decisions issued
by the review boards. For example, in one representative decision, the
NDRB stated:
The NDRB recognizes that serving in the all-volunteer Armed
Forces is challenging but reflects a commitment to our Nation;
thus, servicemembers deserve to be recognized upon completion
of their service. One of the ways in which our servicemembers are
recognized is through the determination of their characterization of service. Most servicemembers, however, serve honorably
and therefore earn their Honorable discharges. In fairness to
those Marines and Sailors who served honorably, Commanders
and Separation Authorities are tasked to ensure that undeserving
servicemembers receive no higher characterization than is
due.304
Liberal consideration disrupts the meritocracy because it considers
factors other than merit in the awarding of honorable discharges. As the
decision demonstrates, boards are weary of diluting the badge of honor by
applying more liberal standards than those applied during the original
separation.
Discharge review, the sole mechanism available to veterans to escape
the bounds of their discharge characterizations, is woefully inadequate to
address the collateral consequences of LTH discharges. The boards were
never intended to provide review beyond the scope of characterizing military service. Liberal consideration provides some consideration of postservice evidence but stops short of considering collateral consequences
and rehabilitation evidence. Mechanisms are needed to address the needs

302. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(d).
303. Id. at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a).
304. Naval Discharge Rev. Bd., No. ND12-01437 (June 12, 2018) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).

2021]

DISCHARGED AND DISCARDED

2255

of veterans with OTH discharges, much like the strategies that states have
adopted to address the collateral consequences of arrests and convictions.
III. REIMAGINING DISCHARGE REVIEW AS A REDEMPTIVE PROCESS
In 2018, a memorandum from Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, Robert Wilkie, to service secretaries addressed the need for a
more redemptive approach to discharge review.305 Secretary Wilkie explained that states were paying increasing attention to pardons for criminal
convictions and “the circumstances under which citizens should be considered for second chances and the restoration of rights forfeited as a result of
such convictions.”306 He called upon the DRBs and BCMRs to consider
using their statutory authority to grant clemency relief to veterans whose
applications were based on pardons for military criminal convictions.307
Interestingly, the memo stated that in addition to granting clemency
in criminal cases, the boards could grant clemency relief based upon “any
other corrections, including changes in a discharge, which may be warranted on equity or relief from injustice grounds.”308 It outlined guiding
principles for clemency consideration and called upon the boards to punish only to the extent necessary, to rehabilitate to the greatest extent possible, and to favor second chances in situations in which individuals have
paid for their misdeeds.309 The memo concluded with a list of factors to be
considered in reviewing matters for clemency relief, including collateral
consequences, length of time since misconduct, critical illness or old age,
acceptance of responsibility, remorse, atonement for misconduct, and evidence of rehabilitation.310
The memo was remarkable for two reasons. First, it provided recognition that administrative discharges have collateral consequences that are
detrimental to veterans, and that relief must be provided when warranted.
Second, it urged the boards to consider clemency in non-courts-martial
cases even though the statutory and regulatory authority to do so is unclear.
This Part responds to the Wilkie Memo and to scholars who have
called for more procedural fairness and deference to veterans in the discharge review system, and for the expansion of VA beneﬁts for veterans

305. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at 1. Robert Wilkie served as Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs from 2018 to 2021 and served as the Under Secretary of
Defense from 2016 to 2018. He served as an officer in the United States Navy and Air Force
Reserves.
306. Id. (stating in the introduction that the Memo will close the gap and set clear
standards for relief that should be granted through Military Discharge Review Boards).
307. See id. at attach. 1 (“Clemency refers to relief speciﬁcally granted from a criminal
sentence and is a part of the broad authority that DRBs and BCM/NRs have to ensure fundamental fairness.”).
308. Id.
309. See id. at attachs. 1–3.
310. Id. at attach. 3.
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with LTH discharges.311 The below proposals offer a bold ﬁrst step toward
creating a system that provides procedural safeguards and ensures the expansion of military beneﬁts for veterans regardless of their minor misconduct in service. The ﬁrst proposal calls for the codiﬁcation and mandatory
implementation of clemency consideration in all cases. The second proposal urges VA to expand beneﬁts for veterans with OTH discharges. Subsequent proposals call for the adoption of reforms tested in the criminal
law context. A thorough discussion of each proposal is beyond the scope
of this Essay. Rather, the purpose of this Part is to brieﬂy discuss the approaches and to demonstrate the need for a combined approach, similar
to that taken by state jurisdictions to address the consequences of arrests
and convictions.312
A. Decoupling Beneﬁts From Discharge Characterizations
Beneﬁts promised at enlistment should not be dependent on discharge characterizations awarded through a system marred by inequities.313 The following proposals offer important ﬁrst steps in separating the
award of beneﬁts from the faulty discharge characterization process. Clemency allows for an upgrade resulting in beneﬁts based on factors beyond
the narrow sliver of a veteran’s military service record.314 Expanding beneﬁts to veterans with LTH discharges fully recognizes that Congress intended for VA to provide beneﬁts to all veterans except under the gravest
circumstances.315
An overhaul of the discharge system and the award of beneﬁts to all
veterans regardless of discharge characterization would be ideal. Congress
311. See, e.g., Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 135 (arguing for the expansion of
VA beneﬁts for all but the most egregious cases); Rebecca F. Izzo, In Need of Correction:
How the Army Board for Correction of Military Records Is Failing Veterans With PTSD, 123
Yale L.J. 1587, 1601 (2014) (arguing for a presumption of causation for veterans with PTSD,
acceptance of veteran’s testimony of combat events, and a presumption that later expert
medical opinions rebut medical assessments at the time of discharge); Ledesma, supra note
23, at 236 (arguing for a new “general-pending” discharge characterization that would provide a temporary discharge status so that veterans with PTSD could seek treatment);
Wishnie, supra note 295, at 1770 (arguing that the current “military law conception” of
board review gives too much deference to commanders and that the system should incorporate more substantive and procedural laws consistent with administrative law, veterans
law, or civil service systems such as the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board).
312. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11361.5 (2019) (California’s automatic expungement law).
313. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1371 (“Many servicemembers were (and continue
to be) kicked out of the military with an other-than-honorable discharge characterization
for misconduct when that misconduct is actually a result of PTSD, traumatic brain injury
(TBI), military sexual assault, or other mental health conditions.”).
314. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attachs. 1–3.
315. See House Hearings on G.I. Bill, supra note 174, at 415 (“We cannot use the words
‘honorable discharge’ because . . . each of the services [differ] and would not include those
discharges under honorable conditions. We do not like the words ‘under honorable conditions’ because we are trying to give the veteran the beneﬁt of the doubt . . . .”).
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is not likely, however, to impose such reforms on the military or VA, nor is
VA likely to adopt such a system in the near future.316 More importantly,
decoupling beneﬁts from discharges would not eliminate the stigma
associated with LTH discharges or the resulting collateral consequences.317
As such, the following proposals offer important and achievable steps to
reform the discharge review process so that more veterans receive the beneﬁts they were promised at enlistment.
B. Codiﬁcation and Mandatory Clemency Consideration
1. Codiﬁcation of Clemency Authority. — The Wilkie Memo was a response to review board members who believed that they were constrained
by the narrow standards of propriety and equity and prohibited from
granting upgrades based on any other grounds.318 The memo was groundbreaking because, for the ﬁrst time, DOD explicitly addressed the problem
of collateral consequences and outlined a progressive and revolutionary
approach that looked beyond a servicemember’s conduct in service.319
Even so, the memo was only the ﬁrst step toward addressing the problem
of collateral consequences. In order to bring awareness to the issue and to
increase the boards’ reliance on clemency as a basis for discharge,
Congress must provide explicit statutory authority for clemency to serve as
the basis for a discharge upgrade in non-courts-martial cases.320 Further,
DOD must mandate the consideration of clemency relief in all cases. Without support from Congress and DOD, the clemency guidance will not
likely change board outcomes or make a signiﬁcant difference in the lives
of veterans.
Without clear statutory authority, clemency consideration for administrative discharges will likely fail. In the context of discharge review, clemency refers to relief granted from a criminal sentence.321 Statutory
authority for clemency is provided under 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552 and 1553. The
statutes provide clear authority for the boards to correct records and to
316. See Bedford, supra note 73, at 715–18 (“While Congress has taken small steps in
granting some beneﬁts to OTH discharged former [servicemembers], it is still unlikely
Congress will change the deﬁnition of “veteran,” create a new eligibility requirement, or
grant an exception to eligibility requirements for disability compensation.”).
317. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 17 (noting that more than 300,000 veterans
were given stigmatizing characterizations).
318. Some board members believed that if the petition did not demonstrate error or
inequity, other factors such as rehabilitation, pre- or post-service conduct, and letters from
witnesses demonstrating the good character of the petitioner could not be considered as a
basis for discharge upgrade. See Email from Robert Powers, President, Naval Discharge Rev.
Bd., to Hugh McClean, Dir., Bob Parsons Veterans Advoc. Clinic, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of
L. (May 15, 2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
319. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attach. 3 (noting that, in determining
whether to grant relief on the basis of clemency, an applicant’s candor and character should
be considered).
320. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(f)(2), 1553 (a) (2018).
321. Id.
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change discharges or dismissals adjudged by courts-martial for purposes of
clemency.322 There is no explicit statutory authority for the boards to grant
clemency in non-courts-martial cases.323 The Wilkie Memo instructed the
boards to consider clemency pursuant to the boards’ authority to address
equity and injustice.324 Prior to the memo, the clemency authority had not
been interpreted so broadly and was strictly limited to cases involving
courts-martial or UCMJ action.325 The boards do not publish statistics that
identify the bases for granting discharge upgrades. But a review of cases
decided by the Army Discharge Review Board in 2019 and 2020 yielded no
results for discharge upgrades based on clemency in non-courts-martial
cases, and only one upgrade of a court-ordered discharge.326 To overcome
the boards’ historically narrow application of clemency and to address the
lack of clear statutory authority, Congress will need to codify the policy if
it is to have any effect on reducing collateral consequences of LTH
discharges.
2. Mandatory Clemency Consideration. — Even if Congress codiﬁed the
policy, the boards’ application of clemency would likely be inconsistent
and underutilized. In 2014, Secretary Hagel introduced the liberal consideration policy to address the issue of less-than-honorably discharged
Vietnam veterans with PTSD.327 In 2017, Congress codiﬁed the policy when
it passed the National Defense Authorization Act.328 By 2019, the boards
were still seeing inconsistent and low grants rates across the services,
prompting two class action lawsuits against the Army and Navy for failing
to properly apply DOD’s liberal consideration policy to thousands of veterans suffering from mental illness.329

322. Id. The DRB may only grant relief based on clemency if the discharge was the
result of a special court-martial conviction. The BCMR may grant clemency relief for discharges adjudged by a special or general court-martial.
323. See U.S. Air Force, The Judge Advocate’s General Corps, Advisory Opinion on Air
Force Discharge Review Board Authority Over Discharges From Special Courts-Martial 1
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.afjag.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?ﬁleticket=nwUWUQEvZ2Y%3D
&portalid=77 [https://perma.cc/3X96-UWCU] [hereinafter Air Force Advisory Opinion].
324. Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at 1.
325. See Air Force Advisory Opinion, supra note 323, at 1.
326. Boards of Review Reading Rooms, U.S. Dep’t of Def., https://boards.law.af.mil
[https://perma.cc/5YYP-CH3H] (last visited Aug. 18, 2021). The boards publish decisions
and statistics in “Boards of Review Reading Rooms.” The author reviewed 100 cases from
2019 and 2020 in which the ADRB granted discharge upgrades. The only clemency relief
offered was in a case involving a court-ordered punitive discharge.
327. See Hagel Memo, supra note 245, at 1 (“BCM/NRs will fully and carefully consider
every petition based on PTSD . . . . To assist the BCM/NRs in the review of records and to
ensure ﬁdelity of the review protocol in these cases, the supplemental policy guidance . . . is
provided . . . .”).
328. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328,
§ 535, 130 Stat. 2000, 2123–24 (2016).
329. See Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110 (D. Conn. 2018); see also Kennedy v. Esper,
No. 16-CV-2010 (WWE), 2018 WL 6727353, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018).
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Stronger implementation of recent DOD discharge review policies
could increase their application and provide more consistency in board
decisions. Scholars have proposed a number of reforms for ensuring the
proper application of liberal consideration.330 For example, services could
amend their regulatory deﬁnition of an honorable discharge to say, for
example, “[h]onorable service includes behavior that may be categorized
as misconduct under the UCMJ but is actually behavior consistent with a
mental health condition due to military service.”331 Presumptions that
override mental health considerations could be amended so that they are
consistent with liberal consideration.332 For example, the presumption of
an equitable discharge and the presumption of regularity could be limited
in cases involving mental illness.333 Or, as some veterans’ advocates have
suggested, Congress could even codify a presumption of record correction
for veterans with documented PTSD.334
Similar changes could be made to strengthen the implementation of
the clemency policy. For example, clemency consideration could be mandated in all cases, instead of leaving its application to the discretion of the
boards. This would require the boards to consider the Wilkie Memo clemency factors in every case. A bifurcated approach to discharge review could
allow for a ﬁnding that the original discharge was properly executed and
otherwise equitable, but that clemency considerations warrant an
upgrade.
In addition to stronger enforcement of the policies, true clemency
consideration would require structural change. The current boards are
not equipped to carry out the clemency mission and, given their history, it
is difficult to imagine them pursuing a robust implementation of the policy.335 The boards’ narrow and inﬂexible approach to discharge review
stands in stark contrast to the forward-looking and redemptive approach

330. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1407.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1410–11.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1412 n.345 (“Legislation should codify a presumption of record correction
for veterans with documented PTSD so that boards continue to improve their handling of
PTSD-related discharge upgrade applications.”(quoting Sundiata Sidibe & Francisco Unger,
Vietnam Veterans of Am. & Nat’l Veterans Council for Legal Redress, Unﬁnished Business:
Correcting “Bad Paper” for Veterans With PTSD 9 (2016), https://www.vetsprobono.org/
library/attachment.312768 [https://perma.cc/M2TR-T2HE])); see also Sara Darehshori,
Hum. Rts. Watch, Booted: Lack of Recourse for Wrongfully Discharged US Military Rape
Survivors 122 (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0516_military
web_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSF6-JMVU] (recommending that Congress “[c]odify a presumption for veterans with documented PTSD that the PTSD contributed materially to discharge classiﬁcation”).
335. Wherry, supra note 22, at 1387 (discussing the review boards’ problematic implementation of the “liberal consideration” standard for discharge cases involving mental
health).
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that clemency provides.336 A restructuring of the boards could provide for
both traditional discharge review and clemency consideration. The current two-tiered structure of DRBs and BCMRs has been criticized as redundant and unnecessary.337 A single board could perform the functions of
the DRB and BCMR, while another board could provide clemency review.
Since discharge review laws already allow for the consideration of clemency in court-martial cases, a specialized board could review clemency petitions stemming from both court-martial and administrative discharges
and would consider factors such as collateral consequences and rehabilitation.338 This approach makes sense given the military’s increasing reliance on administrative justice and the prevalence of discharges with
complex mental health issues.
Any proposals for broader clemency power would likely face opposition. First, clemency could work against veterans. Commanders may be
more likely to impose OTH discharges knowing that they can be upgraded
by a clemency board. Second, clemency could be leveraged in plea negotiations to coerce servicemembers to consent to OTH discharges in lieu of
courts-martial based on the likelihood of an upgrade.339 Third, opponents
may view clemency as infringing on commanders’ discretion and usurping
their powers to maintain good order and discipline. Finally, clemency has
garnered considerable negative attention in the last decade, including a
string of headline-grabbing scandals involving the military that drew the
ire of Congress and DOD. In one case, a Navy SEAL, who allegedly stabbed
a prisoner and was convicted of war crimes, received a pardon from thenPresident Trump.340 Over the objection of Navy leadership, President
Trump also intervened in the servicemember’s pending discharge.341 In
another case, an Air Force pilot convicted of rape was granted clemency
336. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at 1 (“Clemency refers to relief speciﬁcally
granted from a criminal sentence and is a part of the broad authority that DRBs and
BCM/NRs have to ensure fundamental fairness.”).
337. Wishnie, supra note 295, at 1770–73 (arguing for a civil service conception of review boards, similar to the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board).
338. The use of clemency boards is not unprecedented. See Holtzoff, supra note 259,
at 8 (detailing how after World War II, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy
appointed clemency boards to review sentences imposed by courts-martial, with the charge
of reducing excessive sentences).
339. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 3, para. 11(a) (describing the
process for servicemembers to request an OTH discharge in lieu of trial by court-martial).
340. Dave Philipps, Trump Reverses Navy Decision to Oust Edward Gallagher From
SEALs, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/21/us/trump-sealseddie-gallagher.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Nov. 25, 2019)
(stating that Chief Petty Officer Edward Gallagher was accused of “shoot[ing] civilians and
murder[ing] a wounded captive with a knife, among other misconduct,” but was convicted
only of one “relatively minor offense”).
341. Id. President Trump’s eleventh-hour pardons cast light on the nepotism inherent
in presidential pardons. See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Pardon Att’y, Clemency
Recipients, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-donald-j-trump2017-2021 [https://perma.cc/6YQD-8HDY] (last updated Apr. 28, 2021).
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by the convening authority following the sentencing in his case.342 The
convening authority overturned the verdict, released the pilot from
prison, and reinstated his rank.343
While both the military and civilian criminal legal systems have faced
criticism over their use of clemency, it is not likely that administrative discharge cases would draw the same criticism.344 Boards issue panel decisions
and operate as independent military agencies, thus reducing the chance
of politically motivated clemency action. Further, board decisions are not
as highly charged as criminal prosecutions, and decisions are generally issued long after the incidents of alleged misconduct. Lastly, any negative
incentives created by clemency would be offset by positive incentives. For
example, the opportunity for clemency based on evidence of rehabilitation, employment history, or collateral consequences would incentivize
veterans to seek opportunities for rehabilitation after service.
C. The Expansion of VA Beneﬁts
A second proposal addressing collateral consequences involves expanding VA coverage to include veterans with OTH discharges.345 The majority of reentry beneﬁts denied to veterans are offered through VA.
Expanding VA eligibility for less-than-honorably discharged veterans
would be a signiﬁcant step toward removing barriers to veteran
reintegration.
There is precedent for expanding beneﬁts for certain categories of
veterans, and VSOs have overwhelmingly supported such efforts in the
past.346 The basis for the current administrative discharge characterizations of honorable, general, and other-than-honorable evolved from an
earlier dichotomic discharge system that awarded either honorable or
“without honor” discharges to veterans.347 The limited choices under that
system created a dilemma for military commanders whose troops had engaged in misconduct but had generally demonstrated satisfactory military
342. Robert Draper, The Military’s Rough Justice on Sexual Assault, N.Y. Times (Nov.
26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/magazine/the-militarys-rough-justiceon-sexual-assault.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Craig Whitlock, Air
Force General’s Reversal of Pilot’s Sexual-Assault Conviction Angers Lawmakers, Wash. Post
(Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/air-force-generals
-reversal-of-pilots-sexual-assault-conviction-angers-lawmakers/2013/03/08/f84b49c2-881611e2-8646-d574216d3c8c_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that the
convening authority used his clemency authority to reverse the pilot’s conviction).
343. Draper, supra note 342.
344. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of
Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2015) (discussing the
importance of independence in the clemency process).
345. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 135.
346. See Jones, supra note 36, at 2 (describing VA’s efforts in the mid-twentieth century
to expand discharge characterizations in order to “insure more categories of eligibility for
beneﬁts among discharged servicemen”).
347. See id.
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performance.348 Leveraging extensive congressional interest in the military justice system after World War II, VA successfully advocated for DOD
to create deﬁnitive beneﬁt-eligible discharge categories that later formed
the basis for the current discharge system.349 VSOs have always supported
the expansion of veterans beneﬁts, as these organizations fulﬁll their statutory duties primarily by assisting veterans with beneﬁts claims and
appeals.350
Importantly, no congressional action would be needed to expand beneﬁts and services for veterans. Pursuant to congressional delegation, VA
administers its own regulatory bars for veterans.351 Scholars have argued
that limiting exclusions to serious offenses, such as those enumerated in
the statute, is consistent with the legislative history and congressional intent of the G.I. Bill of Rights.352 It is also consistent with the military’s century-old interpretation of “dishonorable conduct,” deﬁned as conduct
involving severe military offenses and civilian felonies.353 Further, an expansion of beneﬁts would bring VA in line with current trends in military
justice that show a decrease in the grant of honorable discharges and a
corresponding increase in the grant of OTH discharges.354
Alternatively, VA could apply liberal consideration in character of discharge determinations. Currently, VA allows veterans with OTH discharges
to request a character of discharge review to determine their eligibility for
beneﬁts under the statutory and regulatory bars.355 If VA determines that

348. Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel: Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the
Subcomm. on Const. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 62–68 (1962) (statement of Alfred B. Fitt, Deputy Under Sec’y of the Army). In 1913, the Army created “unclassiﬁed” discharges that fell between honorable and without honor discharges. Adams &
Montalto, supra note 22, at 76. In 1916, “blue” discharges replaced unclassiﬁed and without
honor discharges. Id. In 1947, the blue discharge was replaced by the general and undesirable discharges, that latter category serving as the precursor to the other-than-honorable
discharge. Id. at 95. Undesirable discharges were later replaced by the other-than-honorable
discharges, resulting in three categories: honorable, general, and other-than-honorable. Id.
349. See Jones, supra note 36, at 2.
350. 38 U.S.C. § 5902 (2018); see also Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def.,
U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under
Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, Chiefs of the Mil. Servs., Chief of the Nat’l Guard Bureau,
Gen. Couns. of the Dep’t of Def. & Assistant to the Sec’y of Def. for Pub. Affs. 1–2 (Dec. 23,
2014), https://DOD.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD015110-14-VSO-MSOmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAC8-Z83G] (describing the “privileges granted [to VSOs]
under the law” and “direct[ing] implementation” of further measures across the DOD to
facilitate delivery of the organizations’ services).
351. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2020).
352. Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 109.
353. Id. at 96.
354. Id. at 97.
355. See U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., Claims for VA Beneﬁts and Character of
Discharge: General Information (2014), https://www.beneﬁts.va.gov/BENEFITS/docs/
COD_Factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQG8-QNCA].
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the conditions that led to a veteran’s OTH discharge were not dishonorable (i.e., not barred by statute or regulation), then the veteran is deemed
“eligible for VA purposes,” despite their OTH discharge.356 For example,
if a veteran received an OTH discharge for using marijuana, VA could conceivably ﬁnd that their conduct was not barred by statute or regulation. In
practice, few veterans are deemed eligible to receive beneﬁts upon discharge review.357 Most are found ineligible because the conditions underlying their discharge are determined to involve moral turpitude or willful
and persistent misconduct under the regulatory bars.358 VA could apply
liberal consideration in cases alleging mental illnesses, as the military has
done, rather than having veterans wait years to receive discharge upgrades
from the military. Applying liberal consideration to VA’s character of discharge review, or even granting beneﬁts for a preliminary period while
veterans’ cases work their way through either military or VA review, would
expand care for veterans who are most in need of VA’s services.
Similarly, VA could apply liberal consideration in service-connected
cases. Veterans with OTH discharges are eligible to receive healthcare beneﬁts but not other VA beneﬁts when VA determines that they suffer from
service-connected illnesses or injuries and they are not otherwise statutorily barred from receiving beneﬁts.359 Veterans may establish service connection in a variety of ways, but it is generally proven by demonstrating
that a current injury or illness was incurred or aggravated during military
service.360 VA could lower the evidentiary bar to obtain healthcare beneﬁts
for applicants who suffer from mental health conditions and have OTH
discharges.

356. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(e); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12.
357. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that in 2013,
VA labeled 90% of veterans with LTH discharges as “dishonorable” and not eligible to receive beneﬁts).
358. Id. at 23–25. On July 10, 2020, VA proposed a new rule in response to a petition
for rulemaking submitted by Swords to Plowshares, a veterans’ advocacy group. In its proposed rule, VA clariﬁed the ambiguous terms it uses in its character of discharge determinations, such as “moral turpitude” and “willful and persistent misconduct.” The new rule
provided some clarity for these terms, deleted outdated terminology, such as “homosexual
acts,” and added language for VA to consider “compelling circumstances” that may mitigate
veterans’ misconduct and qualify them for VA services. The proposed rule, however, did not
signiﬁcantly broaden the standards to make more OTH veterans eligible for VA services. See
Update and Clarify Regulatory Bars to Beneﬁts Based on Character of Discharge, 85 Fed.
Reg. 41,471, 41,473–74 (proposed July 10, 2020) (to be codiﬁed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.12).
359. Act of Oct. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-126, § 2, 91 Stat. 1106, 1107–08 (1977) (providing that veterans with bad Conduct or dishonorable discharges are not eligible to receive
healthcare beneﬁts).
360. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Ct. Vet. App. 49, 51 (1990) (“In
order to demonstrate entitlement to beneﬁts for a disability . . . a veteran must show that
the disability resulted from either an ‘injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty,
or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty.’”
(quoting 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
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Finally, VA could provide mental health care for all veterans, regardless of discharge, and forgo the framework of emergency exceptions and
limited categories imposed by statutes and regulations. First, such a policy
is prudent because it addresses a current crisis. Second, VA is the largest
healthcare system in the country and has some of the most sophisticated
technology and expertise to treat military-related mental health issues.361
VA has the resources and expertise to extend mental health services to
more veterans.362 Third, providing veterans with comprehensive mental
health treatment is in the interest of national security. The United States
has not relied on a draft since the Vietnam War.363 Men and women, the
majority of whom are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, volunteer to sacriﬁce their lives in service to the nation. If this trend is to
continue, the nation must improve care for more veterans. Lastly, providing health care to veterans is the right thing to do. Withholding expert VA
mental health care from any veteran violates the sacred military ethos:
“Never leave a fallen comrade.”364
D. Applying Criminal Law Reforms to the Military
In addition to the technical approaches discussed above, several
mechanisms employed in the criminal law context to remove collateral
consequences stemming from involvement in the criminal legal system
could be applied to the military discharge system. This section brieﬂy outlines the application of those mechanisms.
1. Certiﬁcates of Restoration of Rights for Veterans. — Several jurisdictions
have experimented with certiﬁcates restoring rights or establishing the rehabilitation of persons involved in the criminal legal system.365 The military discharge review system was intended to achieve similar goals by
upgrading veterans’ discharges and restoring beneﬁts eligibility. Yet the
boards have been reluctant to accept mitigating factors, including mental
health, in cases involving misconduct.366
361. See Sarah Kliff, Five Facts About Veterans’ Health Care, Wash. Post (Nov. 12,
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/11/12/five-facts-aboutveterans-health-care/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that VA “operates the
country’s largest health system” and “has pioneered electronic health records”).
362. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-545SP, Veterans’ Growing Demand for
Mental Health Services 1–2 (2021), (explaining that VA has expanded mental health services, is preparing for continued increase in demand for mental health services, and is working to increase awareness of mental health services through tools such as telehealth).
363. Bernard D. Rostker, The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force 1 (2006), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9195.html [https://perma.cc/SZX7-EUV5].
364. Gary Riccio, Randall Sullivan, Gerald Klein, Margaret Salter & Henry Kinnison,
U.S. Army Rsch. Inst. for the Behav. & Soc. Scis., Warrior Ethos: Analysis of the Concept and
Initial Development of Applications 17 (2004), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21479/
[https://perma.cc/37TZ-YWZB].
365. See Love et al., Forgiving and Forgetting, supra note 121, at 15–17.
366. See Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 2, Kennedy v. McCarthy, No. 16cv-2010-CSH, 2020 WL 7706604 (D. Conn. ﬁled Nov. 17, 2020) (noting that plaintiffs alleged
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The creation of clemency boards would resolve this problem by decoupling beneﬁts from discharge characterizations. For example, if a veteran’s military service involved serious misconduct but their post-service
conduct demonstrated successful rehabilitation, a clemency board could
issue a certiﬁcate of rehabilitation restoring the veteran’s VA beneﬁts.367
Such authority would require federal legislation, but it would give the
boards an option to restore beneﬁts for rehabilitated veterans by sidestepping the often contentious characterization issue. The stigma of an LTH
discharge would remain, but at least the veteran would obtain beneﬁts for
their service.
2. Presidential Pardons. — Presidential pardons are wrought with politics, bureaucracy, and cronyism, though there is precedent for their use
in resolving thorny military discharge issues.368 In 1974, President Gerald
Ford signed Proclamation 4313 authorizing an incentive program for
Vietnam War veterans who had evaded the draft or deserted their military
duties to upgrade their discharges.369 Upon completion of twenty-four
months of alternative service promoting the health, safety, or interests of
the United States (not including military service), veterans could receive
a “clemency discharge” in lieu of their undesirable discharge.370 In 1977,
President Jimmy Carter granted pardons to all veterans who could be alleged to have committed an offense in violation of the Military Selective
Service Act by evading the draft.371 These pardons did not restore beneﬁts
or grant full absolution to veterans, though they arguably helped unite a
divided nation reeling from the Vietnam War.372
Any sitting president could issue clemency discharges granting beneﬁts to veterans with mental health problems that received LTH discharges.
Eligibility could be tailored to a speciﬁc time period, as it was for Vietnam
War veterans, or tailored to cover veterans of any conﬂict who experienced
that veterans with service-connected PTSD, TBI, and related mental health conditions received OTH and general discharges and were subsequently denied status upgrades by the
ADRB).
367. See Frank M. Headley, The Exemplary Rehabilitation Certiﬁcate, 22 JAG J. 77, 77–
78 (1968) (noting that during the Vietnam War, the Department of Labor awarded rehabilitation certiﬁcates to veterans with LTH discharges based upon exemplary post-service
conduct).
368. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law,
90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 802, 819–24 (2015).
369. Proclamation No. 4313, 88 Stat. 2504 (Sept. 16, 1974).
370. Id. at 2506. The clemency discharge did not make veterans eligible for VA beneﬁts.
Id. The undesirable discharge was a precursor to the other-than-honorable discharge.
Update and Clarify Regulatory Bars to Beneﬁts Based on Character of Discharge, 85 Fed.
Reg. 41,471, 41,474 (proposed July 10, 2020) (to be codiﬁed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.12).
371. Proclamation No. 4483, 91 Stat. 1719 (Jan. 21, 1977).
372. Andrew Glass, Ford Issues Partial Amnesty to Vietnam Deserters, Sept. 16, 1974,
Politico (Sept. 16, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/16/ford-amnesty-vietnam
-deserters-815747/ [https://perma.cc/W3BM-UBPM] (stating that President Ford noted in
his proclamation that “reconciliation calls for an act of mercy to bind the nation’s wounds
and to heal the scars of divisiveness”).
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mental health problems in service. Clemency boards could oversee the
process, including the review of more complex cases. Unlike the clemency
discharges issued by Presidents Ford and Carter for Vietnam War veterans,
beneﬁts could be restored under a presumption that medical reasons were
a contributing cause of the veteran’s discharge.
3. Ban-The-Box for Veterans. — There is no clear reason why veterans
must disclose their discharge status to civilian employers, at least not initially. Reference checks are a common practice in hiring, but few job candidates are vetted at the outset of the process using previous employers’
performance evaluations.373 Like ban-the-box protections, questions about
veterans’ discharges should be eliminated from job applications, and a refusal to hire based on an applicant’s discharge characterization should
only be permitted if the circumstances underlying the discharge are directly related to the occupation for which employment is sought.374
No single approach to addressing collateral consequences is comprehensive, and there is no shortage of policies that could address the problem. Ban-the-box regulations and statutes could be adopted to eliminate
questions about discharge status, the military could remove discharge
characterizations from the DD-214, and the discharge process could be
amended to create less stigmatizing outcomes for servicemembers with
mental illness. Unlike the contentious issues that divide criminal law reform along political lines, policies facilitating veteran reintegration are bipartisan.375 Yet the stigma and bias surrounding less-than-honorably
discharged veterans remain a barrier to much needed reform. The codiﬁcation of clemency and its mandatory application in discharge review,
along with a realignment of VA exclusions that more closely track with
congressional intent, offer two technical approaches to address the problems inherent in military discharge review. These proposals offer bold approaches that will begin to address the mental health crisis facing our
veterans.
CONCLUSION
The military discharge review system is broken. Veterans with mental
health conditions are discharged at alarming rates and labeled with LTH
discharges that have lasting and debilitating consequences. The situation

373. Policy, Data, Oversight: Assessment & Selection, Off. Pers. Mgmt., https://www.
opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/assessment-and-selection/other-assessment-methods/reference
-checking/ [https://perma.cc/A4QJ-PZ7G] (last visited July 28, 2021).
374. See Human Rights Report, supra note 217, at 2. See generally Avery & Lu, supra
note 103 (reviewing ban-the-box laws at the city, county, and state levels).
375. See, e.g., Nikki Wentling, Sweeping Veterans Bill Becomes Law, Impacting “Every
Corner” of the Community, Stars & Stripes (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.stripes.com/
theaters/us/sweeping-veterans-bill-becomes-law-impacting-every-corner-of-the-community1.657643/ [https://perma.cc/FCJ6-NSUU] (noting that a bill “that aims to help veterans
facing a variety of challenges” obtained unanimous approval in Congress).
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is not unlike the problem affecting a growing number of Americans suffering from the collateral consequences of criminal arrests and convictions. The criminal legal system disproportionately affects people of color,
predominantly Black and brown people, whose criminal records are subsequently used to formally and informally exclude them in the contexts of
employment, licenses, permits, housing, public beneﬁts, and civil rights.
As a result, a signiﬁcant and vital segment of our population is continually
funneled into additional criminality and imprisonment with no hope of
reintegration.
States have begun to address the problem through various statutory
and judicial reforms. “Forgiveness” models favor court-issued certiﬁcates
of rehabilitation that absolve individuals of past wrongs and serve as a token of full remediation, while executive pardons offer relief to individuals
by removing legal disabilities and penalties associated with convictions.
Concealment models offer expungement and record-sealing to remove
criminal histories from public view. Some states have adopted licensing
and employment laws that exclude the consideration of criminal records
that do not directly relate to the duties of the profession. These reforms
are promising and will serve as models for more states to address the
problem.
Less well known or understood are the collateral consequences of
LTH discharges. Less-than-honorably discharged veterans are excluded
from dozens of life-saving VA programs, such as healthcare and housing
programs, that are aimed at assisting veterans facing reintegration challenges. In addition to VA exclusions, these veterans are excluded from federal employment protections and from state employment, education, and
licensing programs. Moral injury, the psychological strain that veterans
may experience as a result of their discharge, is the least understood but
arguably the most troubling of these consequences. VA’s recognition of
this trauma, especially in Vietnam Era veterans, is an essential ﬁrst step in
understanding its harmful impact and eliminating it as a barrier to reentry.
Shockingly, there are no effective remedies to address the collateral
consequences of LTH discharges. Discharge review, which offers relief for
a limited number of veterans whose petitions are granted based on equity
and impropriety grounds, does not consider the collateral consequences
of discharges. Liberal consideration provides the review boards with limited discretion to upgrade discharges based on evidence of mental illness
obtained after service. Otherwise, the boards do not consider clemency,
collateral consequences, or evidence of rehabilitation that is not directly
linked to the period of service under review. As a result, most veterans
carry a lifetime label of dishonorable service that can never be forgiven or
forgotten.
Soldiers, sailors, and airmen, often experiencing social and economic
hardship, enlist in the military in part based on the promise of beneﬁts
that will assist with their successful reintegration after service. When they
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are injured and exhibit symptoms in the form of misconduct, they are discharged with LTH service characterizations and succumb to the burdens
of the collateral consequences resulting from those discharges. The military, VA, and Congress must stop ignoring the burden our veterans carry
long after service and instead start providing veterans with a chance to
succeed by addressing these collateral consequences.

